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INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 1988, Ilo Grundberg killed her eighty-three year-old
mother with eight shots from a handgun while the victim held a
cheerful birthday card.' Ms. Grundberg was charged with second
degree murder,2 but prosecutors asked the court to dismiss the case
when psychiatric evaluations determined that Ms. Grundberg had
been involuntarily intoxicated with the prescription sedative Hal-
cion.3 Ms. Grundberg filed a $21 million lawsuit against Halcion's
manufacturer, The Upjohn Company, alleging that Halcion was a
defective drug and that Upjohn failed to warn her of the severe and
sometimes fatal adverse reactions 4 that could result from ingesting
the drug. In fact, Upjohn's label for Halcion did contain a warning
that "paradoxical reactions," which include violent behavior, had
been reported following the use of therapeutic doses of Halcion,5
1. See Geoffrey Cowley, Sweet Dreams or Nightmare?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1991, at 44
(reporting incident as part of article examining evidence that prescription drug Halcion may
predispose recipients to aggressive behavior).
2. Id
3. Id; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt,JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.10(f), at 394
(2d ed. 1986) (defining "involuntary" intoxication as intoxication resulting from ingestion of
mistaken substance; substance taken under duress; substance taken pursuant to medical ad-
vice; or pathological intoxication where person knows he or she is taking substance but is
unaware of reaction he or she may have to substance). Halcion, known generically as triazo-
lam, is a sedative-hypnotic among the structural class of medications known as
benzodiazepines. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2340 (46th ed. 1992).
4. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2340-41 (46th ed. 1992).
5. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1843 (40th ed. 1986) (warning of paradoxical reac-
tions following therapeutic doses of Halcion and cautioning against drug's use in patients with
signs or symptoms of depression); see also R.C.W. Hall & S. Zisook, Paradoxical Reactions to
Benzodiazepines, 11 BRrr. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 99S, 103S (1981) (concluding that para-
doxical reactions are very rare and idiosyncratic with no associated clinical indicators). Re-
ported paradoxical reactions to the usual sedative effect of benzodiazepines at the time of the
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and the company might have reasonably relied on this warning to
relieve it of liability. 6 Instead, Upjohn settled Ms. Grundberg's
claim out of court for a reputed multi-million dollar amount.
7
A significant problem for people who suffer adverse drug reac-
tions such as Ms. Grundberg's is the unavailability of a reasonable
means of compensating their unexpected and often devastating in-
juries.8 Adverse drug reactions are a significant source of morbidity
and mortality in this country, causing three to six percent of all med-
ical admissions 9 and as many as 160,000 deaths per year.' 0 Such
injuries tend to go uncompensated without a lengthy adversarial
process, however, that is generally only available in cases like Ms.
Grundberg's where the injuries are serious and the product manu-
facturer wealthy." I
The problem confronting Upjohn and other pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers regarding adverse drug reaction claims is the growing
cost and unpredictability of product liability in the face of increasing
costs for bringing drugs to market.12 Pharmaceutical manufacturers
are required by law to provide rigorous evidence that their products
are both safe and effective as a prerequisite to marketing.' 3 These
same manufacturers, however, may later face lawsuits sounding in
negligence or strict liability for the inadequacy of labels that were
previously approved as essential elements of their products' safety
and efficacy. 14 This paradoxical result comes at a time when the
Grundberg shooting included bizarre uninhibited behavior, euphoria, restlessness, hallucina-
tions, hostility, rage, paranoia, and suicidal ideation. Stewart C. Harvey, Hypnotics and Seda.
tives, in GOODMAN AND GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 339, 349-50
(Alfred G. Gilman et al. eds., 7th ed. 1985).
6. See generally Lane D. Bauer & Laura D. Stith, The Duty to Warn, in PRODUrs LIABILITY
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG CASES §§ 4.07-4.20 (Donald E. Vinson & Alexander H. Slaughter
eds., 1988) (analyzing issues of adequacy of pharmaceutical warnings).
7. See Liz Hunt, Data on Sleeping Pill's Effects Were Incomplete, Upjohn Says, WASH. POST,
Aug. 28, 1991, at A2 (noting reported settlement between Ms. Grundberg and Upjohn of
millions of dollars, but that settlement stipulates all documents relevant to case remain
confidential).
8. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (documenting inadequacy of tort law
compensatory function).
9. Brian L. Strom, Pharmacoepideniology: Current Status, Prospects, and Problems, 113 AN-
NALS OF INTERNAL MED. 179, 179 (1990) (citing D.M. DAVIES, TEXTBOOK OF ADVERSE DRUG
REACTIONS 4 (3d ed. 1985)).
10. See id. (citing Samuel Shapiro et al., Fatal Drug Reactions Among Medical Inpatients, 216
JAMA 467, 467-72 (1971)).
11. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 796 (1990) (discussing
legal and financial obstacles that stand in way of tort victim's recovery, and mentioning specif-
ically that if tortfeasor lacks resources, judgment for plaintiff is "empty remedy").
12. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text (describing costs of new drug
development).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1988) (mandating that manufacturers include full reports
concerning drug's safety and effectiveness when filing new drug application).
14. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (describing mandatory pharmaceutical
labeling process and its extensive regulation by FDA); cf. FOOD AND DRUG LAw INSTITUTE:
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United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), under a deter-
mined new commissioner, I5 is more aggressively enforcing current
safety standards while Congress actively seeks to provide more pow-
erful enforcement tools. 16
The problem facing health care consumers with respect to the
pharmaceutical industry is a chilling of new drug development and
an actual loss of some existing therapies without an appreciable in-
crease in safety. 17 For example, the United Kingdom recently re-
moved Halcion from the market as a result of concern about
reactions such as those suffered by Ms. Grundberg, 18 'despite the
fact that the drug is the most widely used prescription treatment for
insomnia in the world.' 9 After analyzing the available data, the FDA
has refused to do the same in the United States20 in part because
Halcion has clear advantages over other drugs in its class 21 and in
part because reactions such as those exhibited by Ms. Grundberg
FOOD AND DRUG LAW 164-81 (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991) (describing food labeling re-
quirements of FDA).
15. See Malcolm Gladwell, FDA Chief Relishes Label of Lawman, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1991,
at Al (crediting Dr. David Kessler, FDA's new commissioner, also known as "Eliot Knessler"
for his Eliot Ness-like pursuit of nation's biggest food and drug firms, with revitalizing
agency).
16. See New Enforcement Tools Would Be "Helpful," but FDA Not Waiting, 53 F-D-C REP.
("The Pink Sheet"), Aug. 12, 1991, at 7 (quoting Commissioner Kessler as stating that FDA
will not wait for congressional action before vigorously enforcing drug safety and efficacy
laws); FDA Enforcement Draft Bill Would Provide Administrative, Judicial Recall Power as Well as Civil
Fines: Draft Bill Reflects Commissioner Kessler's "Wish List, " 53 F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"),
Mar. 25, 1991, at 2 (noting that proposed H.R. 2597, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) is consis-
tent with Kessler's belief that FDA needs greater enforcement powers).
17. See Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 334-48 (Peter
W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (describing adverse effects of product liability on
pharmaceutical research and development and focusing specifically on loss of Bendectin, drug
used for treatment of morning sickness, loss of childhood vaccines development, and delays
in development of orphan drugs, drugs used for treating rare disorders); infra notes 49-61
and accompanying text (discussing treatment gap created by loss of Bendectin and chilling
effect of product liability on development of orphan drugs).
18. See Liz Hunt & Glenn Frankel, Britain Takes Halcion Sleeping Pills Off the Market, WASH.
POST, Oct. 3, 1991, at A3 (reporting review of data that showed Halcion caused much higher
incidence of depression and memory loss than similar drugs).
19. See Geoffrey Cowley, Sweet Dreams or Nightmare?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1991, at 48
(reporting that annual Halcion prescriptions exceed other popular sleeping pills by millions).
20. See Malcolm Gladwell, Why the FDA Cleared Hakion, WASH. POST, June 2, 1992, at Z7
(noting that higher association of adverse reactions with Halcion were due largely to use of
dose now believed to be well above what is ideal and safe).
21. See Mitchell B. Baiter & E.H. Uhlenhuth, The Beneficial and Adverse Effects of Hypnotics,
52 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 22 (1991) (finding that triazolam has improved effect on
residual sedation and daytime functioning over other hypnotic drugs such as flurazepam and
temazepam, but higher finding of anterograde amnesia, which is inability to recall events oc-
curring after use of drug). But see Andrew J. Heritch et al., A Case of Psychosis and Delirium
Following Withdrawal from Triazolam, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 168, 168 (1987) (noting inci-
dence of withdrawal symptoms from triazolam, which may include psychotic behavior, makes
triazolam worse choice for treating insomnia than other hypnotics).
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are exceedingly rare and not unique to Halcion. 22
As a consequence of these concerns, the issue of product liability
is receiving close scrutiny by Congress. 23 In the most recent in a
long line of uniform product liability acts, Congress is currently con-
sidering Senate bill 640, which would create an absolute defense to
punitive damages claims for drugs approved by the FDA. 24
Although the Senate failed to approve the bill in the 1992 session, 25
the bill enjoys wide support in the Senate, and Senators vow to go
forward with the bill early in the next session.26 Also, the Presi-
dent's Council on Competitiveness chaired by Vice President
Quayle recently recommended significant limits on punitive dam-
ages along with other measures that would significantly hinder the
pursuit of product liability claims. 27
22. See David Greenblatt, Current Status of Benzodiazepines (Part II), 309 NEW ENG.J. MED.
410, 414 (1983) (noting rarity of paradoxical reactions such as florid psychoses that are seen
primarily during abrupt withdrawal from high doses of benzodiazepines).
23. See Gary Lee, Corporate Lobby Tries to Create 'Big Mo' on Product Liability Bill, WASH.
PosT,July 29, 1991, at A9 (citing increase in congressional support for limitations on product
liability despite 10 years of failure to enact restrictions on such liability).
There is some evidence, however, that the need for such legislation may be waning. See
Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability,
39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 741 (1992) (documenting decrease in plaintiff success rates in product
liability cases filed in federal courts). Excluding the massive and unsuccessful Bendectin liti-
gation, the authors found that at the federal district court level, the plaintiff success rate fell
from 41% to 31% between 1979 and 1989 in product liability cases that report ajudgment for
plaintiff or defendant. Id. These declining plaintiff success rates, explicit lawmaking in prod-
uct liability cases at both the trial and appellate levels, and declining product liability filings
lead the authors to posit that a pro-defendant revolution began in the early 1980s and contin-
ued at least through 1989. Id. at 743-44.
24. See S. 640, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 303(c)(1) (1991) (prohibiting punitive damages,
absent misrepresentation, against manufacturers of products approved as safe and effective by
FDA); see also 138 CONG. REC. S13,149 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond) (speaking in support of product liability bill and noting that proponents of bill have
been trying to enact product liability legislation since 1980). But see Product Liability Government
Standards Defense Proposal, 53 F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"), Sept. 23, 1991, at 6 (quoting
Professor Michael Rustad as stating that Senate bill 640 would have little impact on pharma-
ceutical manufacturers because punitive damages cases invariably involve fraud or withhold-
ing of information, that is, misrepresentation, that bill excludes from protection). At least
three other bills with similar co-sponsorship would preempt state regulation of pharmaceuti-
cals, at least with respect to punitive damages. See H.R. 3030, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 6(d)(1)(A) (1991) (prohibiting awards of punitive damages against manufacturers of drugs
and devices approved by FDA); H.R. 2701, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(i) (1991) (limiting scope
of punitive damages awards against professionals); H.R. 2700, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 8(e)(l)(A) (1991) (forbidding punitive damages awards against manufacturers of drugs sub-
ject to premarket approval).
25. See 138 CONG. REC. S13,155 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992) (reporting that Senate voted
58 to 38 to close debate on bill, thereby coming up two votes short of required minimum of
60 votes to close debate prior to voting on bill).
26. See id. at S 13,155-56 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (proclaiming that "a very clear
majority of the Senate" supports Senate bill 640 and assuring colleagues that he plans to go
forward with bill early next session); id. at S13,156 (statement of Sen. Kasten) (noting that
majority of Senate supports bill and stating that he is prepared to move forward with legisla-
tion early next session).
27. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITrVENESs, AGENDA FOR CIVIL.JUSTICE REFORM IN
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Application of common law product liability precepts to pharma-
ceutical manufacturers assigns the burden of a risk to the product's
creator, who is invariably the party best able to avoid the risk.
28
Manufacturers, in turn, spread the risk of injury among the public as
a cost of doing business. 29 There is evidence, however, that phar-
maceutical product liability has a chilling effect on the development
of health care products30 without reasonably compensating those in-
jured by such products or significantly enhancing drug safety over
that achieved through pervasive federal regulation.
31
This Comment will examine the state of pharmaceutical product
liability and address the conflicts arising in the current system of
concurrent pharmaceutical regulation by both the FDA and state
common law liability systems. The Comment analyzes alternatives
to this concurrent regulation that may in some combination deal
more efficiently with both the needs of the industry for a predictable
liability system and the needs of consumers for drug safety and in-
jury compensation. Part I briefly reviews the evidence of product
liability's direct effect on drug development, availability, and cost.
Part II examines the history of concurrent regulation of phar-
maceuticals by the FDA and the states through the common law of
AMERICA 1, 11-13 (Aug. 1991) (outlining reform of discovery and expert evidence rules with
recommendations for voluntary dispute resolution, changes in trial procedures, altered use of
federal judicial resources, and "eliminating litigation over poorly drafted legislation"). Act-
ing on this initiative, President Bush has signed an Executive order that includes a "loser
pays" provision for certain contract disputes and other suits brought by the Federal Govern-
ment. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 (1991); seeJohn E. Yang, Lawyer Guidelines
Aim to Cut Costs, Delays, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1991, at A21 (quoting President Bush stating fear
of lawsuits has restricted access to health care, kept products off market, and increased con-
sumer prices). In his State of the Union Address, President Bush called for the passage of the
1990 product liability reform bill. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 146, 148 (Jan. 31, 1990) (citing product
liability reform as "the will of the people"); supra note 25 (providing citation and salient fea-
tures of 1990 product liability bill).
28. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,J.,
concurring) (claiming that manufacturer is best situated to afford protection against consumer
injuries). Justice Traynor's position that responsibility for product injuries should be fixed
with the one best able to afford protection against a risk, regardless of negligence, was also
adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963).
29. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (endorsing cost-spreading function of strict liability).
30. See Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986) (reporting finding
of Dr. Martin H. Smith, president, American Academy of Pediatrics, that liability concerns
have constraining effect on research and development of vaccines); AMERICAN MED. ASS'N,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 137TH ANNUAL MEETING 79 (1988) [hereinafter
AMA PROCEEDINGS] (finding that product liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers has
profound negative impact in that it tends to inhibit development of innovative products).
31. See Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 291, 293 (Peter W. Huber &
Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (noting marginal effect of liability laws and legislation on safety
when compared with federal regulation and role of physicians as learned intermediaries who
provide instructions on safe drug usage to patients when prescribing medications).
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product liability. Part III surveys model alternatives to concurrent
regulation. These alternatives include judicial preemption and no-
fault compensation for drug-induced injuries and are exemplified by
the systems currently operating in Sweden through the Swedish
Pharmaceutical Insurance and in the United States through the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Part IV analyzes the
efficiency of concurrent regulation and examines the effectiveness of
product liability as a mechanism to deter risks and compensate
those injured. Part V recommends preempting state causes of ac-
tion against pharmaceutical manufacturers as an initial remedy in
exchange for an industry-funded, no-fault system of drug injury
compensation. This Comment concludes that the concurrent sys-
tem of drug regulation is costly and provides neither a significant
increase in safety nor an efficient means of compensating persons
injured by adverse drug reactions. The adoption of a no-fault sys-
tem of drug injury compensation addresses these inefficiencies by
meeting the needs of pharmaceutical manufacturers for a predict-
able system of liability, as well as consumer needs for safety, access
to health care developments, and drug injury compensation.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
Evidence of the direct effect of pharmaceutical product liability on
drug development is not comprehensive. Research expenditures
for contraception and fertility, for example, fell ninety percent from
a peak in expenditures in 1973.32 Twelve of thirteen companies
once active in this area terminated research and development within
the last twenty years. 33 A recent study by the National Research
Council and the Institute of Medicine cited product liability as a
principle factor inhibiting the development of new contraceptives.3 4
Similarly, despite the profound benefit of childhood vaccines on
public health, the number of vaccine manufacturers has declined
32. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 155
(1988) (discussing status of birth control research and noting that chemical formula for ster-
oid oral contraceptives has not changed since 1976, nor have any new contraceptive chemical
entities been introduced since 1968).
33. AMA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 30, at 86.
34. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MEDICINE, DEVELOPING NEw CONTRA-
CEPTIVES-OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 141 (1990) (citing unpredictable nature of litiga-
tion and failure of courts to give sufficient emphasis to compliance with FDA regulations as
significant disincentives for research). As a result, American manufacturers' preeminence in
the area of fertility research and development has all but disappeared. See HuBER, supra note
32, at 155 (quoting pharmaceutical company president stating that no one in his or her "right
mind" would work on products for pregnant women because of enormous liability risks such
work engenders).
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significantly.3 5 For some vaccines only a single supplier remains. 36
There is little doubt that this decline in vaccine availability is due to
the overwhelming burden of product liability.3 7 As an illustration of
this burden, in one instance a punitive damages claim against a for-
mer vaccine manufacturer totaled more than 200 times the annual
revenue generated by the vaccine.3 8
In addition, product liability has had a predictable effect on the
cost of available vaccines, as well as on research into new vaccines.
For example, the cost per dose of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis
vaccine (DTP) increased from 114 in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986.39
Eight dollars of this price went for liability insurance. 40 While the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (Act)41 establishes a
no-fault system of compensation for injuries suffered as a result of
certain vaccine usage, not all vaccines are covered.42 Moreover, the
35. See H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344-45 (noting that decline in number of vaccine manufacturers has
caused decline of immunization against some preventable diseases coupled with increase of
disease incidence).
36. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348 (noting that only one manufacturer of
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and two manufacturers of diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis (DTP) vaccine remain actively engaged in production of these vaccines).
37. See INsTrrurE OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 2, 11 (1985) (finding that
liability concerns threaten investment in development of vaccines). Vaccines are uniquely sus-
ceptible to adverse effects of liability for a number of reasons: (1) vaccines can cause birth
defects and these cases tend to foster large awards; (2) unlike drugs, vaccines require ex-
tremely complex and specialized production facilities; (3) production of individual lots of vac-
cines can take six to twelve months, which leads to inventory and cashfiow problems on the
part of the manufacturer;, (4) vaccines are administered in a limited number of doses, and the
success of a vaccine can have a downward effect on demand; (5) the largest foreign markets
are often third world countries with limited resources for such purchases; and (6) vaccine
experts needed for litigation are relatively few, and those arguably most competent, those
with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) or the FDA, are generally not available because
federal policy prevents government employees from testifying in disputes between private
parties. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 341-43 (examining above-listed disincentives as well as
additional discouragement produced by product liability on vaccine development).
38. See HUBER, supra note 32, at 166-67 (noting that as recently as 1986, manufacturer of
whooping cough vaccine was named as defendant in new lawsuit each week and faced over $2
billion in damage claims). One dose in 310,000 of DTP, the vaccine used to immunize chil-
dren against whooping cough, causes permanent damage because the diphtheria portion of
the vaccine includes a crude preparation of whole bacteria. See Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes
Huge Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339, 1339 (1986) (noting that up to 20
million doses of DTP are sold in United States each year).
39. Kolata, supra note 38, at 1339. From 1984 to 1986, the mean price paid by the CDC
to stockpile vaccines for emergent needs rose from $2 per dose to $12 per dose. See Robert
M. McKenna, Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of a Vaccine Against
the AIDS Vrins, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 955 (1988) (analyzing possibility of similar price stress
on development of vaccine for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)).
40. Kolata, supra note 38, at 1339.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (1988).
42. See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act). Legislation modeled on the National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act is pending that would establish a trust fund to cover adverse reactions involving
injury, illness, disability, or death after receiving a vaccine for HIV. H.R. 5893, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992). Injured persons could not file suits against manufacturers before exhausting
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Act does not affect claims made before October 1, 1988.
4 3
A number of commentators have indicated that liability concerns
threaten the development of a vaccine for the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV),44 the infectious agent responsible for the
acquired immune deficiency syndrome epidemic currently threaten-
ing the lives of more than one million persons.45 Product liability
has already demonstrably slowed the development of a vaccine for
HIV. 46 At least one major pharmaceutical manufacturer has halted
promising research and development into a vaccine for HIV, and
others have postponed clinical trials pending changes in the legal
climate.47 The cost of such a delay is impossible to calculate, but
with expenditures for the HIV epidemic measured in billions of dol-
lars, 48 any delay will add significantly to the social costs of liability.
remedies under the act. IA § 2151(a)(2)(A). Manufacturers could not be held liable for una-
voidable side effects or for injuries solely due to the manufacturer's failure to provide direct
warnings to the injured party. Id. § 2162(c). A covered vaccine would be presumed to be
accompanied by proper directions and warnings if its manufacturer shows that it complied
with all requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and § 351 of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act. Id § 2162(b)(2).
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-30011 (1988) (stipulating requirements for claims of
compensation).
44. See, e.g., Deborah M. Barnes, Will an AIDS Vaccine Bankrupt the Company That Makes It?,
233 SCIENCE 1035, 1035 (1986) (noting that pharmaceutical companies may be less willing to
invest money in production of AIDS vaccine in legal climate wherein lawsuits against manu-
facturers are richly rewarded); Donald P. Francis & John C. Petricciani, The Prospects for and
Pathways Toward a Vaccinefor AIDS, 313 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1586, 1586-87 (1985) (recognizing
liability concerns as major reason why companies are reluctant to invest large amounts of
money in development of AIDS vaccine); AlisonJ. Arnold, Comment, Developing, Testing, and
Marketing an AIDS Vaccine: Legal Concerns for Manufacturers, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1084
(1991) (enumerating unsolved social, ethical, and legal problems confronting HIV vaccine
development); Peter Huber, AIDS and Lawyers, NEw REPUBLIC, May 5, 1986, at 14 (predicting
that no manufacturer would produce readily available AIDS vaccine given current legal cli-
mate). But see McKenna, supra note 39, at 963-64 (arguing that although pharmaceutical com-
panies face many obstacles in developing HIV vaccine, legal liability is not one of them).
45. See Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop, October
31 - November 1, 1989, 39 MORBIDIrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 110, 110 (1990) (estimating
that one million persons in United States are currently infected with HIV): see also Sophia W.
Chang et al., The New AIDS Case Definition; Implications for San Francisco, 267JAMA 973, 973-75
(1992) (stating that national projections based on 1987 definition of AIDS disease estimate
there will be between 139,000 and 188,000 people living with AIDS in 1992, whereas addi-
tional 169,000 to 440,000 HIV-infected individuals are projected to classify under new AIDS
diagnosis); Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 265 JAMA 848, 848-49
(1991) (estimating that 165,000 to 215,000 persons will die of AIDS during 1991-92).
46. SeeJon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccine?, 256 SCIENCE 168, 168 (1992) (quot-
ing AIDS division chief at National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease who voiced
opinion that liability concerns are slowing progress in vaccine research). For example, while
vaccines may be useful in preventing transmission of the AIDS virus to the fietus of an infected
mother, use of the vaccine during pregnancy can cause birth defects. Id. at 170. Moreover, in
the absence of a national healthcare system in this country, HIV-infected people often have
little or no access to sufficient health care. Id. at 169. As a result, the prospect of ajury award
for an injury might add an incentive to seek a legal remedy. Id.
47. See id. (noting Oncogen's halt in HIV vaccine development and MicroGeneSys' post-
ponement of tests in HIV-infected pregnant women due to liability concerns).
48. See Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, supra note 45, at 848-49
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Access to individual drugs has also suffered as a result of product
liability. The principle example of this phenomenon is the case of
Bendectin, the only drug marketed in the United States for the
treatment of nausea and vomiting associated with pregnancy.49
Bendectin was voluntarily removed from the U.S. market in 1983 as
a result of multi-million dollar claims that it caused birth defects in
children carried by women who were prescribed the drug during
pregnancy. 50 Despite over thirty million exposures in utero, expert
opinion was sharply divided on this issue although the preponder-
ance of evidence indicated that Bendectin was not a significant ter-
atogen.5 ' The FDA and most courts were unequivocal in finding no
increased risk of birth defects associated with Bendectin. 52 Never-
theless, no drug is currently on the market for the treatment of nau-
sea and vomiting during pregnancy, nor is any active research
currently underway in this area.55
More recently, product liability has proven to be a significant dis-
incentive in the development of orphan drugs, drugs that are used
to treat rare diseases. 54 The intention of the Orphan Drug Act of
1983 was to encourage the development and availability of products
used in the treatment of rare disorders by increasing monetary in-
(stating that in 1989 insurers paid out more than $1 billion for reimbursement of AIDS-re-
lated claims).
49. See generally Lasagna, supra note 17, at 337-41 (examining history of Bendectin's
demise).
50. Lasagna, supra note 17, at 338.
51. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts,
43 HASTINGS LJ. 301, 318-19 (1992) (noting that none of 39 epidemiological studies clearly
concluded Bendectin was teratogen). Six studies reported at least one significant correlation
between Bendectin and some adverse effect, while 33 studies either drew no conclusion or
found no statistical relationship. Id. at 340.
52. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992)
(finding insufficient evidence to conclude Bendectin caused plaintiff's birth defect), petition for
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (U.S. June 9, 1992) (No. 91-1987); Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing and following independent FDA
advisory panel finding nothing to implicate Bendectin exposure as cause of increased inci-
dence of birth defects), af'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989);
Lynch v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 867 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient to support conclusion that Bendectin caused her birth defect), aff'd,
830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
53. See AMA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 30, at 88 (citing conclusion of American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists that Bendectin's loss is "significant therapeutic gap" result-
ing in nutritional deficiencies in some women because their pregnancy-induced vomiting is
untreated). Even members of the plaintiff's bar concede that Bendectin was driven from the
market by unjustified litigation. See Michael A. Pretl & Heather A. Osborne, Trends in U.S.
Drug Product Liability-The Plaintiff's Perspective, in PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE PHAR-
MACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON 109, 114 (Geraint G. Howells ed.,
1990) (noting evidence that suggests Bendectin does not cause higher incidence of fetal
deformities than incidence of birth defects in newborn population as whole).
54. See Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893, 893
(1991) (noting that before 1983 Orphan Drug Act was enacted, few drugs to treat rare or
"orphan" diseases had been developed).
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centives for such research.55 Congress recognized that on average,
orphan drugs would cause more adverse reactions in patients than
would non-orphan products.56 Congress also recognized that or-
phan drugs present unique problems in determining safety and effi-
cacy because very few persons qualify to participate in clinical trials
for the drugs. 57 Nevertheless, no provision was made in the statute
for protecting these drugs from liability. 58 While the forty-two or-
phan products developed between 1983 and 1989 constitute a sig-
nificant increase in rare disease treatments, nearly one-fifth have
already been the target of liability claims. 59 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, a recent survey of manufacturers identified product liability as
a major disincentive to the development of orphan drugs. 60 The
Public Health Service also concluded that liability concerns have led
to serious delays in the development of orphan drugs and to in-
creases in insurance costs.6
1
Product liability, however, has arguably had a beneficial effect on
the safety of health care products. The Dalkon Shield, an intrauter-
ine contraceptive device marketed by A.H. Robbins Company, was
driven from the market by liability exposure when it was found to
cause an increased incidence of pelvic inflammatory disease and ste-
rility in women using the device. 62 Similarly, Accutane (isotreti-
noin) was first marketed in 1982 to treat severe cystic acne with the
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (1988) (permitting sponsors of orphan drug development to
obtain grants to defray qualified clinical testing expenses); id. § 360cc (providing exclusive
seven-year marketing rights for unpatentable types of orphan drugs).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 840, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) (citing findings of 1980 survey
performed by U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health and Environment that
orphan drugs cause more severe side effects than drugs for common diseases).
57. See id. (noting that such inherent difficulties make these drugs unprofitable to
develop).
58. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1988) (failing to shield orphan drug manufacturers
from common law product liability claims); Asbury, supra note 54, at 894 (noting that Act
made no attempt to address common law treatment of liability).
59. See Asbury, supra note 54, at 894 (noting that new products were intended for treat-
ment of wide range of rare diseases, including human immunodeficiency virus, various can-
cers, and Parkinson's disease).
60. See Asbury, supra note 54, at 893 (noting product liability as one of three major disin-
centives limiting commercial interest in orphan drug products). Orphan drugs may be more
vulnerable to liability claims because the reduced number of patients with an orphan disorder
provides fewer opportunities to detect adverse reactions during clinical trials. Id. at 894.
61. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON ORPHAN DISEASES, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON ORPHAN DISEASES xvi (1989) (noting that liability concerns serve to deter treatment of
persons with rare diseases, delay development of drugs, and increase insurance costs). The
Commission recommended legislative resolution of product liability issues and urged special
relief for orphan products threatened by liability. Id. at 104.
62. See Pretl & Osborne, supra note 53, at 113 (arguing that liability's adverse effect on
early oral contraceptives research resulted in hasty development of intrauterine devices that
were unsafe when marketed). Before removing the Dalkon Shield from the market in 1974,
A.H. Robbins Company defended more than 13,000 lawsuits representing over 300,000 indi-
vidual Dalkon Shield claims and made payments of nearly $3 billion to these plaintiffs. id.
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knowledge that it was teratogenic in animals and, as a result, it was
marketed with a specific warning that it should not be used by wo-
men at any time before or during pregnancy. 63 When birth defects
resulting from Accutane use were reported in the medical literature,
Hoffmann-La Roche, the drug's manufacturer, acting out of fear for
its liability exposure and on the recommendation of an FDA advi-
sory committee, sought to affirmatively reduce the risk that preg-
nant women would use the drug. The company added a pregnancy
prevention kit to its Accutane product that included an instructional
video tape for physicians, information for patients, an informed con-
sent form, and a true-false test to be completed by the patient to
ensure physicians could be satisfied that patients understood the
risk.64
Do the benefits of pharmaceutical product liability justify the ap-
parent social costs of lost therapies or research forgone? The re-
mainder of this Comment examines this question in the context of
the current regulatory safeguards for prescription drug marketing
and the common law compensatory mechanisms for adverse drug
reactions.
II. THE CONCURRENT REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS
Decisions regarding whether to develop and market a drug are
based in part on a balancing of the perceived profitability of a drug
against the costs of bringing the drug to market.65 Both the FDA
and state common law exert regulatory demands that impose costs
on drug manufacturers. The portion of costs traceable to satisfying
the demands of the FDA can reasonably be estimated, while the
costs of product liability cannot.66 This section reviews the de-
mands of the FDA and of state common law, which may complement
or contradict one another.
A. Federal Regulation
The history of the FDA reflects an increasingly pervasive involve-
63. See Swazey, supra note 31, at 312-13 (noting that Accutane received approval from
FDA despite agency's recognition that drug may cause fetal abnormalities).
64. See Swazey, supra note 31, at 313 (discussing efforts of Hoffman-La Roche to make
use of Accutane safer).
65. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 336-37 (detailing incentives and disincentives to phar-
maceutical development and explaining that costs of research plus significant risks of poten-
tial damage claims play significant role in manufacturer's economically based decision
whether to market particular drug).
66. See, e.g., Lasagna, supra note 17, at 337 (describing unpredictability of litigation as
unknown quantity that may threaten company's existence); see also infra note 215 and accom-
panying text (providing average cost of bringing drug to market in compliance with FDA
regulations).
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ment in every aspect of drug approval and postapproval surveil-
lance. 67  The FDA is entrusted with ensuring the safety and
effectiveness of all drugs and medical devices on the market. 68 The
agency draws on its own expertise and enforcement powers69 as well
as on those of outside medical authorities.70 Regulation extends
from preapproval testing of new drugs to drug manufacturing, la-
beling, advertising, and postapproval surveillance of adverse drug
reactions. 71 Such pervasive regulation has led to significant criti-
cism of the FDA, including charges that the agency contributes to
unnecessary delay in the marketing of new chemical entities.2
However, faced with the possibility of erring by allowing an unduly
dangerous drug to enter the market or of delaying the availability of
an effective medication, the FDA has consistently tended to empha-
size safety in attempting to strike an appropriate balance. 73
67. See generally FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTrrTTE, supra note 14, at 1-163 (detailing history
of FDA as one developing in response to tragic injuries and increasing demand for federal
protection of public health). In 1962, for example, Congress significantly tightened federal
control over the pharmaceutical industry by amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The amendments added the requirement that pharmaceuti-
cal companies follow good manufacturing practices, id. § 101, 76 Stat. at 780-81 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360(F) (1988)), provided for government inspection of manufactur-
ing plants, id, § 201, 76 Stat. at 792-93 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1988)),
added the requirement that the government weigh drug effectiveness with drug safety, id.
§ 102, 76 Stat. at 781-82 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a) (1988)), and added the
requirement that pharmaceutical companies conduct adequate and well-controlled studies of
the drug's effects on humans. Id. § 103, 76 Stat. at 782-83 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c (1988)). See generally Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before
andAfter 1962, 32 PERSPECrIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED., 322, 330-31 (1989) (detailing history and
substantive points of amendments).
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(b) (1988) (describing preapproval provisions for pharmaceuti-
cals regarding appointment of review panels concerning studies on humans); see also David
Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW ENG.J. MED. 281, 283 (1989) (examin-
ing preapproval process and noting that FDA regulates composition and function of institu-
tional review boards that monitor research involving human subjects).
69. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360 (1988) (defining prohibited acts, penalties, and require-
ments of food and drug approval).
70. See Fredrick H. Degnan, An Introduction to FDA Advisory Committees, 45 FOOD DRUG
CosM. LJ. 709, 714-16 (1990) (noting that 38 standing committees, including committees of
physicians, nurses, epidemiologists, and pharmacologists, have become integral parts of FDA
decisionmaking process).
71. See 21 C.F.R. § 200-226 (1991) (regulating scope of labeling, advertising, and
sound manufacturing practices). Federal regulation is so pervasive in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry that courts have found it sufficiently analogous to liquor and firearms regulation as to
hold that warrantless searches of pharmaceutical companies are not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v.Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d
532, 537 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that drug manufacturers' capacity to cause harm is so great
that they fall into carefully defined class of exceptions to search warrant requirement), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
72. See THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMmrrrEE ON SCIENCE, RE-
SEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY, FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT DELAYS THE
AVAILABILrrY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS, at 12-29 (1980) (detailing factors contributing to
lengthy drug approval process).
73. See Milton Friedman, Frustrating Drug Advancement, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1973, at 49
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Drugs must be tested in animals, subject to sound laboratory
practices, and must show evidence of safety before any human test-
ing may begin.7 4 Animal and other chemical and manufacturing
data is compiled and reported in an application or Notice of
Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug (IND),75 which
must include: (1) sufficient data indicating the drug is reasonably
safe for humans;7 6 (2) detailed protocols for human trials showing
testing in humans is reasonably safe;77 (3) details of the drug's
chemistry and processes of manufacture; 78 and (4) identification of
proposed investigators and evidence of their qualifications to per-
form clinical trials. 79 Only after this material is reviewed and sanc-
tioned by the FDA may clinical trials begin.
Preapproval human trials are conducted in three phases and are
subject to FDA proposed and final standards known as current
"Good Clinical Practice" regulations and clinical guidelines. 80
Phase I clinical trials, designed to document a drug's safety, are
conducted in small numbers of healthy adults and are of short
duration.8' Phase II clinical trials are conducted in as many as sev-
eral hundred persons who have the medical condition that the drug
under review is designed to treat.82 Phase III trials, which
require detailed protocols and evaluation by investigators, include
(noting that history of tragedies like thalidomide led FDA to choose conservative approach to
drug approval).
74. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1) (1988) (describing acceptable laboratory practices for
nonclinical testing, including those tests performed on animals). The Secretary of Health and
Human Services is directed by 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988) to promulgate regulations protecting
public health during investigational new drug safety and efficacy testing.
75. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3 (1991) (defining IND as investigational new drug application,
synonymous with "Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug").
76. Id § 312.23(a)(5)(i)-(v).
77. Id. § 312.23(a)(6).
78. Id. § 312.23(a)(7).
79. Id. § 312.23(a)(6)(b).
80. See NEw DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A REGULATORY OVERVIEW 64-65 (Mark Mathieu ed.,
1987) [hereinafter NEw DRUG DEVELOPMENT] (describing FDA's publication, "General Con-
siderations for the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs," as outlining elements in clinical testing to
meet FDA requirements).
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1991) (providing that studies may be conducted on pa-
tients or volunteers and typically include groups of 20 to 80 subjects); see also NEw DRUG
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 80, at 66 (describing these short-term "clinical pharmacology" stud-
ies as determinative of further human study by establishing metabolism, pharmacologic ac-
tion, and early side effects data).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (1991) (stating that Phase II trials include evaluating effec-
tiveness of drugs on specific medical conditions); see also NEw DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note
80, at 71-72 (contrasting Phase I short-term human trials with Phase II studies, which are
usually of longer duration and are designed to measure drugs' efficacy as well as safety). The
FDA will often require an "end-of-phase 2" meeting to evaluate all data gathered to that point
before permitting a manufacturer to proceed to Phase III clinical trials. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.47(b) (1991) (authorizing FDA to conduct such meetings to minimize wasteful expendi-
tures and assist in design of later studies).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
thousands of effected persons and are conducted over a period of
years in order to more comprehensively analyze the target drug's
safety, efficacy, and dosage.
3
Only after this process is completed may a manufacturer apply for
FDA approval of a drug, which is done through a New Drug Appli-
cation (NDA).84 This document is a comprehensive collection of all
data available on a drug at the time of the application and includes
samples of the drug and proposed labeling for the drug.8 5 If further
information is required for the FDA to accurately evaluate a new
drug's performance, the agency will not hesitate to request it.86 If
the FDA finds insufficient data supporting a drug's clinical safety
and effectiveness or deficiencies in manufacturing, processing, or
labeling of the drug, the agency must deny approval of the
application. 8
7
Central to the determination of a drug's safety and often disposi-
tive on the issue of a manufacturer's liability is the sufficiency of the
drug's labeling.88 While a manufacturer may desire to include every
conceivable adverse reaction on a drug's label to protect itself from
liability, warnings are limited to describing the results of scientific
testing.89 To ensure that a label does not obscure essential informa-
tion among a sea of warnings included only because of liability con-
83. See 21 G.F.R. § 312.21(c) (1991) (providing that Phase III trials are intended to
gather additional information on effectiveness and safety of drugs); see also NEW DRUG DEVEL-
OPMENT, supra note 80, at 98-104 (setting forth requirements of Phase III studies and noting
FDA's focus on them as pivotal to drug's approval). All proposed studies must be reviewed
not only by the FDA but also by an investigational review board (IRB). See 46 Fed. Reg. 8942,
8977 (1981) (comments to adopted rule) (rule codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 56.109
(199 1)) (detailing FDA regulation of IRBs). An IRB must verify the scientific integrity of the
study it oversees and ensure that the testing does not expose participants to inappropriate
risks. See Kessler, supra note 68, at 283 (noting that FDA holds IRB responsible for ethical
conduction of research).
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988) (mandating pharmaceutical manufacturers' use of
NDAs to introduce any new drugs into interstate commerce).
85. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1991) (detailing requirements of NDA).
86. See Nancy Mattison & Barbara W. Richard, Postapproval Research Requested by the FDA at
the Time of NCE Approval, 1970-1984, 21 DRUG INFo.J. 309, 313 (1987) (graphically depicting
increasing trend of postapproval research as condition of new drug marketing).
87. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(1)-(16) (1991) (detailing 16 reasons fbr denying approval
of NDA, including failure to perform adequate tests to show whether or not drug is safe for
use).
88. See 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7470 (1985) (comments to adopted rule) (rule codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (1991)) (stating that drug's label is standard by which FDA
determines drug is safe and effective). The FDA draws on the extensive experience of clinical
investigators, practicing physicians, and independent advisory panels in determining a label's
contents. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,437 (1979) (comments to adopted rule) (rule codified
as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57, 201.100 (1991)) (detailing sources that FDA consults to
obtain complete and accurate explanation of drug label).
89. See 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229,33,231 (1974) (comments to proposed rule) (rule codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (1991)) (stating FDA will prescribe warning on drug label only
when there is significant medical evidence of possible health hazard).
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cerns, regulations specifically preclude manufacturers from warning
consumers of unknown or theoretical adverse reactions that their
drug might cause.90 Indeed, labels may not even reflect differences
of opinion with respect to potential dangers of the drugs.9 1
Postapproval changes in labeling are subject to a similarly rigor-
ous review process.9 2 Technically, a manufacturer may change a
label at any time to enhance the safety of a drug.93 In practice, how-
ever, manufacturers may not change a label without approval of the
FDA.
94
Regulation also extends to drug advertising.95 Advertising that
presents unsubstantiated information such as claims of safety or ef-
fectiveness superior to that of another product,96 or references
90. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(d) (1991) (stipulating that warnings shall be only of known
hazards, not theoretical hazards); 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,446-47 (1979) (comments to
adopted rule) (rule codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57, 201.100 (1991)) (citing FDA
Commissioner's belief that including theoretical hazards as contraindications in drug labeling
would cause that important section of labeling to lose its significance).
91. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1) (1991) (prohibiting inclusion on labels of differing opin-
ions regarding contraindications, precautions, adverse reactions, and other product hazards).
Permitting conflicting opinions would destroy the usefulness of drug labels by obscuring es-
sential information among differing views, with limited space to adequately address the weight
of any given opinion. See 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,232 (1974) (comments to proposed rule)
(rule codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (1991)) (noting that few statements on drug
labels do not evoke some controversy among medical professionals). These regulations re-
flect the policy of avoiding an overload of information in which trivial or rare reactions would
dilute the importance of critical warnings. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products
Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 237-38
(1986) (noting that physicians frequently have little time to refer to labeling and therefore
information should be limited to what is reasonably required for physician to make treatment
decisions). Some courts have acknowledged this label-diluting problem. See, e.g., Finn v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) (noting danger of inundating physicians with
every conceivable risk includes risk of diluting notice of serious adverse reactions); Dunn v.
Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that warnings must be
selective to be effective and that excessive warnings might dissuade physicians from reading
them).
92. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (1991) (detailing procedures for supplementing or changing
approved application); 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7470 (1985) (comments to adopted rule) (rule
codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (1991)) (stating that more than any other change,
label changes effect FDA's previous conclusions concerning safety and efficacy).
93. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i)-(iv) (1991) (permitting label changes to enhance
safety).
94. See Cooper, supra note 91, at 236 (noting that neither FDA nor manufacturers envi-
sion that labels may be changed without approval of FDA). With the pervasive scope of FDA
oversight of the drug approval process, manufacturers must work closely with the agency.
Manufacturers are therefore very reluctant to be perceived as acting unilaterally. Id More-
over, any label change is costly and must be approved by the FDA eventually. Id The risk
always exists that the agency will find the change unsupported by sufficient evidence and re-
quire that it be removed from the label. Id.
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988) (requiring that advertisements quantitatively report
each ingredient contained in drug and describe side effects, contraindications, and effective-
ness of drug). FDA regulations similarly require that advertisements include descriptions of
side effects, warnings, precautions, and information concerning effectiveness of drugs. 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1991).
96. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(ii) (1991) (defining drug effectiveness comparisons in ad-
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favorable test results while disregarding concurrent or more recent
unfavorable data,97 may render a drug "misbranded" and subject to
seizure.
98
Investigational obligations often do not terminate upon approval
of an NDA.99 According to one study, additional research into a
drug's long-term effects has become an FDA condition of approval
in one-third to one-half of drugs reviewed. 00 While such re-
search is expensive' 01 and frequently does not result in labeling
changes, 10 2 the practice is indicative of the FDA's insistence on ob-
jective, long-term review of drug safety.' 03
Nevertheless, even the most comprehensive preapproval testing
will not uncover all adverse events that a new drug might engen-
der.104 To keep the FDA abreast of these events, manufacturers are
required to report serious and unexpected adverse drug reactions to
the agency within fifteen working days of the reaction. 05 Annual
vertising without substantial support as misleading and violative of Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act).
97. See id § 202.1(e)(6)(viii) (defining as misleading any advertisement that refers to
favorable data while ignoring concurrent or more recent unfavorable data regarding drug's
performance).
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1988) (authorizing seizure of drugs that are "misbranded"
through deceptive advertising practices). Courts have held that even when warnings are ade-
quate by themselves, a manufacturer may still be held liable for drug-induced injury if over-
promotion obscures the warning. See, e.g., Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 159,
163 (D.S.D. 1967) (holding manufacturer liable where doctor was inundated by overwhelming
amount of literature regarding product safety and warnings); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183,
195-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that manufacturer may be liable for overpromotion of
adequate warnings, unless there exists intervening cause of harm to patient); Stevens v. Parke
Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (finding excessive promotion may have effect of
persuading physician to disregard warning).
99. See generally Mattison & Richard, supra note 86, at 309 (examining FDA's conditioning
of marketing approval on additional studies ranging from testing in special populations to
refining dosages).
100. See id. at 323 (noting that postapproval studies are now standard FDA practice and
not exceptional requirement). Mandatory postapproval research reflects the FDA's balancing
of public needs for access to effective new therapies against the continuing need for assessing
the safety of such therapies. See id. at 309 (describing FDA's approval of levodopa for treat-
ment of Parkinson's disease as compromise, because it occurred on condition that manufac-
turer conduct postapproval studies of long-term effects of chronic use, which enabled clearly
effective drug to become available two to three years earlier than otherwise would have been
possible).
101. See id at 318 (showing range of median costs of postapproval studies examined to be
between $60,000 and $530,000).
102. See id at 323 (finding that two-thirds of postapproval drug studies examined resulted
in data not different enough from NDA data to warrant label change).
103. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing FDA's emphasis on drug
safety and objective criterion on which FDA evaluates new drugs).
104. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RIsKs 1976-
1985 3 (1990) (reporting that more than half of drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and
1985 had serious postapproval risks, as evidenced by label changes or removal from market
after postapproval study period).
105. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c)(1) (1991) (requiring reporting of overdoses or any
other reaction that is fatal, life-threatening, permanently disabling, or results in congenital
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reports must be submitted detailing any information that might af-
fect safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug. 10 6 The FDA is au-
thorized to withdraw approval of an NDA for a manufacturer's
failure to make any required reports. 10 7 Approval may also be with-
drawn if the FDA determines at any time that the drug is unsafe.' 08
Indeed, failure to comply may subject a manufacturer to civil and
criminal penalties. 10 9
Moreover, the FDA has aggressively used its existing enforcement
powers" 0 while Congress has actively sought to provide additional
enforcement authority."' Enforcement activities such as drug
seizures for mislabeling are increasingly common as a result of the
FDA's general campaign to more forcefully assert its role as protec-
tor of public safety. 112 Though criticized in the past as un-
derfunded, ill-equipped, and incapable of effectively performing its
anomaly or cancer). Other adverse reactions must be reported every quarter for the first
three years after approval and annually thereafter. Id. § 314.80(c)(2). Furthermore, manufac-
turers are required to disclose data regarding adverse reactions occurring outside the United
States. See EllenJ. Flannery, Reporting Foreign ADRs and ADRs in Phase IV Studies, and the Signifi-
cance of Causality Assessment, 46 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 43, 50-51 (1991) (noting that FDA's
requirement of reporting any serious adverse drug experiences without regard to causality
includes reporting of any foreign data).
106. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2) (1991) (specifying contents of mandatory annual
postmarketing reports). These annual reports must include any alterations in product manu-
facturing, labeling, or chemistry and any new clinical or animal test data available on a drug,
whether or not the test data was produced by the manufacturer. Id.
107. Id. § 314.81(d).
108. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1988) (authorizing rescinding of NDA approval upon finding
that drug is unsafe).
109. See id. 99 331-334 (defining prohibited acts that subject pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers to injunction proceedings, criminal penalties, and drug seizures).
110. See Lena Williams, F.D.A. Steps Up Effort to Control Vitamin Claims, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9,
1992, at Al (recounting raid by bulletproof vest-clad FDA agents on clinic that illegally pro-
vided "vitamin-mineral concoctions" for injection). But see Nancy L. Buc, FDA Enforcement
1991: Some Questions, 47 FooD & DRUG L.J. 149, 149-50 (1992) (questioning whether FDA's
aggressive law enforcement is efficient, fair, and wise). The FDA's present enforcement pow-
ers include the power to seek injunctions, criminal indictments, and to seize products. See 21
U.S.C. § 372 (1988) (detailing powers and authority of FDA enforcement personnel).
111. See 137 CONG. REC. S18,706-07 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy) (introducing legislation to enhance FDA enforcement authority and noting that despite
regulation of 254 of every dollar spent in this country, FDA simply does not have necessary
means to enforce law).
112. See Liz Hunt, FDA Seizes $5 Million Worth of Collagen Products, WASH. PosT, Aug. 17,
1991, at A14 (describing medical device seizure for manufacturer's inadvertent failure to in-
clude one line of print on package insert as part of "tougher line" at FDA). Much of the
change in the FDA's enforcement activities has been accredited to the recent appointment of
Dr. David Kessler, a physician and attorney who previously taught food and drug law at Co-
lumbia University School of Law, as the new commissioner of the FDA. See Herbert
Burkholtz, A Shot in the Arm For the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 30, 1991, at 15, 17 (noting
that Kessler, upon taking office, immediately sought increased administrative and judicial au-
thority to order product recalls). Dr. Kessler's aggressive enforcement of food and drug laws
has reportedly revitalized an agency whose low morale had seriously compromised its effec-
tiveness. See Malcolm Gladwell, FDA Chief Relishes Label of Lawman, WASH. PosT, Oct. 24, 199 1,
at Al (describing new enthusiasm throughout FDA created by Kessler's sense of purpose).
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public-protection mandate, ' 3 the FDA has recently been granted
significant funding increases by Congress.11 4 More importantly,
Congress is seeking to enhance the FDA's enforcement powers. ' 5
Senate bill 2135, the new FDA enforcement bill, would for the first
time grant the FDA administrative recall authority,1 16 seizure and
embargo authority,"17 subpoena power,"18 and would permit civil
money penalties for drug safety and efficacy violations. 1 9
B. Common Law Regulation
Regulation of an industry is the coercive power to dictate corpo-
rate behavior. A number of courts have recognized that state com-
mon law exerts such regulatory authority. 120 Compliance with
federal regulation, however, may have no effect on common law reg-
ulatory demands, and in fact the two often conflict. 121
113. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MIT'EE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 15 (1991) (depicting dramatic disparity be-
tween resources and responsibilities at FDA and examining recent legislation that has left
FDA incapable of fulfilling its statutory obligations); John K. Iglehart, The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration and Its Problems, 325 NEw ENG.J. MED. 217, 217 (1991) (delineating FDA's ineffec-
tiveness as result of Reagan administration's deregulation policy during 1980s and of
congressional enactment of 32 new FDA-related laws without providing adequate funds to
implement them). The FDA has also been the object of severe criticism for lax oversight. See
FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Versed: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss) (reporting that FDA was
brought before Congress three times in two years for failure to recognize manufacturer's
gross violation of legal reporting requirements); FDA's Regulation of Zomax: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of
Rep. Weiss) (faulting FDA for failure to require manufacturer to include warning of life-
threatening reactions, despite knowledge of such reactions by FDA for over one year, and for
permitting drug to enter market without further testing despite animal data that indicated
drug may cause cancer).
114. See Iglehart, supra note 113, at 217-19 (documenting FDA's significant budgetary in-
creases for fiscal year 1991 and noting additional increases scheduled for 1992). The 1992
increases, however, include significant contribution of "user fees," which are charges to the
regulated industries. Id. These fees have not been approved by Congress. Id.
115. See S. 2135, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (providing enforcement tools currently
granted to other regulatory agencies). Industry opposition to new enforcement powers for
FDA is, however, considerable. See Senate Enforcement Bill Contains "Loophole" in Subpoena Au-
thority Provision Allowing FDA Access to Confidential Information, PMA 's Mossinghoff Testifies, 54 F-D-
C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"), May 25, 1992, at 5 (noting that Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's
Association remains strongly opposed to enforcement bill and believes, for example, that civil
penalties should be available only for repeated or significant violations).
116. S. 2135, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
117. Id § 4.
118. Id. §5.
119. Id. § 6. The House version would provide similar enforcement tools. H.R. 3642,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
120. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab., 697 F.2d 222, 228 (8th Cir. 1983) (assuming that
product liability, as state common law mechanism, exerts regulatory effect by motivating man-
ufacturer through economic self-interest to make safer products); Salmon v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that state product liability common law
exacts high degree of care from manufacturers and that compliance with federal laws and
regulations will not absolve manufacturers from such common law liability).
121. See Salmon, 520 F.2d at 1362 (holding that manufacturer's compliance with federal
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The scientifically derived evidence that manufacturers must pro-
vide the FDA to establish the safety and efficacy of a drug may pro-
vide precious little protection from product liability claims.'
22
Indeed, while courts have held that the failure to comply with FDA
regulations constitutes negligence per se,' 23 courts have also held
that a showing of compliance is only relevant to the issues of defec-
tiveness or unreasonable danger and does not absolve the manufac-
turer from liability. 124 This imbalance stems from the well-known
adage that there is no such thing as a government standards de-
fense. 125 Such standards represent merely a floor of safety below
which a defendant's product may not fall.' 26 Both the FDA and
manufacturers, however, regard regulatory oversight as a compre-
drug laws and regulations does not absolve manufacturer of liability for failure to effectively
and adequately warn consumers of drug's inherent dangers); see also Abbot v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that preemption of state law does not
immediately follow from federal regulation and explaining that when Congress does not ex-
pressly state its intent, there is strong presumption against preemption, especially with state
regulation of health and safety matters).
122. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652,658 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding
that compliance with federal regulation does not preclude manufacturer's liability); Salmon,
520 F.2d at 1362 (holding that compliance with federal laws and regulations cannot indemnify
manufacturer); see also Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regula-
tion and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 243 (1987) (con-
cluding that FDA regulation affords only modest protection from liability, while evidence of
noncompliance may virtually establish liability).
123. See, e.g., Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455,461 (4th Cir. 1960) (regard-
ing, as negligence per se, violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that was proxi-
mate cause of injury); Lukaszewica v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65
(E.D. Wisc. 1981) (holding violation of statute designed to protect class of persons to be
negligence per se when violation results in harm to person in that class); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (establishing negligence from failure
to comply with adverse reaction reporting regulations). As defined by the American Law In-
stitute: "The unexcused violation of... an administrative regulation which is adopted by the
court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable [manufacturer], is negligence in
itself." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(I) (1965).
124. See, e.g., Mazer v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding com-
pliance with FDA requirements not necessarily indemnifying manufacturer from negligence
liability on defectiveness issue); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan.
1987) (finding compliance with FDA regulations not conclusive on liability issue with danger-
ous vaccine); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985)
(finding compliance with FDA requirements admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence but
not conclusive on issue).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) (stating that compliance with
government standards does not prevent finding of negligence); Thomas Scarlett, The Relation-
ship Among Adverse Dng Reaction Reporting, Drug Labeling, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption,
46 FOOD DRUG CosM. LJ. 31, 39 (1991) (noting thatjury is traditionally permitted to consider
compliance with government standards merely as factor in determining negligence liability).
126. See Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.D. 1966) (holding
without discussion that FDA regulations are minimal safety requirements), aff'd, 411 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (noting
without inquiry that warnings required by regulatory agencies may be only minimal in nature);
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 391 (N.J. 1984) (holding FDA regulations are mini-
mal standards with no effect on manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers about which it knew
or should have known); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416,423 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976) (refusing to find FDA regulation as providing more than minimum standard of safety).
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hensive determination of safety, viewing regulations in general and
labeling in particular as central to the determination that a drug is
safe and effective.1 27 In fact, the FDA regards as its mandate the
requirement that drug labeling be fully adequate to convey all nec-
essary information to a physician.1 28 Moreover, it seems unreasona-
ble to suggest that Congress, by extending to the FDA ever-wider
mandates to ensure safety through controlled clinical trials and en-
hanced policing power, intended merely to establish a floor of
safety. ' 29
Nevertheless, courts permit juries to decide whether the risks of
drug-induced injury are outweighed by benefits to patient health. 3 0
Even though manufacturers and the FDA are required to determine
that a drug's utility outweighs its risks,131 juries are allowed to per-
form their own risk-benefit analyses on a case-by-case basis.' 32 This
occurs despite the fact that NDAs may be many thousands of pages
127. See Cooper, supra note 91, at 237 (observing that product liability exerts strong in-
centive on manufacturer to issue warnings that are adequate); Scarlett, supra note 125, at 33
(describing FDA's perception that label is centrally important document as reason for pro-
tracted, careful review process). But see Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334 (1985) (noting that agencies
are actually quite happy to have product liability as "safety valve" for focusing hostility on
manufacturers when harm to consumers does occur).
128. See 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392, 15,392 (1975) (comments to proposed rule) (rule codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56, 202.1 (1991)) (noting that primary purpose of FDA labeling
regulations is to adequately provide physicians with all information needed for safe and effec-
tive patient care); see also Scarlett, supra note 125, at 40 (rejecting notion that labeling require-
ments are meant to be minimal safeguards, given careful NDA review process and mandatory
disclosure of adverse drug reaction data).
129. See Lasagna, supra note 67, at 324 (noting that 1962 amendments to Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act were based in principle part on need to assure public that only drugs
of high quality would be permitted on market); see also supra notes 115-19 and accompanying
text (discussing House bill 2597, which proposes to increase FDA's enforcement powers).
130. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981) (al-
lowing jury to consider social utility and desirability of pharmaceutical product along with
product's risks in determining if product is unreasonably dangerous); Salmon v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding summary judgment inappropriate when
jury could find that benefit from use of "valuable, life saving" antibiotic was not commensu-
rate with risk of blood disorder specifically warned of in antibiotic's label).
131. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (1991) (requiring integrated summary of drug risks
and benefits and discussion of why benefits exceed risks under conditions stated in labeling).
132. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 851 F.2d 1536, 1540 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding
jury's role in risk-utility analysis because absence of product liability may increase uncertainty
of vaccine's quality, thereby discouraging its use); Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
1108, 1115-16 (4th Cir.) (holding that reasonableness of warning is question of fact for jury
and that neither treating physician's view nor compliance with federal regulation is conclusive
on question of adequacy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1981) (permitting jury to weigh risks and benefits of high-
dose contraceptive and its low-dose alternative); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273
(5th Cir.) (affirming two-step analysis to determine if vaccine is so unsafe that marketing it at
all is unreasonably dangerous per se, and if not, whether introduced into commerce without
sufficient safeguards, product is unreasonably dangerous as marketed), cert. denied, 419 US.
1096 (1974); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (noting
that warning adequacy is substantial issue of material fact for jury to consider).
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in length and may engage multiple scientific disciplines, 133 and that
a trial may focus the bright light of hindsight on a relatively small
collection of negative data.
13 4
This case-by-case approach has produced findings directly at odds
with FDA determinations. The most striking examples include jury
determinations that the FDA's authority over labeling provided in-
adequate protection to consumers.' 3 5 Warnings have been found
inadequate despite the fact that the FDA mandated the precise
wording of the warnings as part of a uniform class labeling require-
ment. 136 And even when the FDA expressly rejected a warning
change requested by a manufacturer because the alteration was not
supported by sufficient scientific evidence, juries have still found
manufacturers liable.' 37 Some courts permit juries to find liability
even when a risk has not been conclusively established.' 38 This
133. See Gibbs & Macder, supra note 122, at 223-25 & n.193 (observing that NDAs often
include extensive chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, and clinical data and noting that NDA
summary alone may be over two hundred pages).
134. See Gibbs & Madder, supra note 122, at 225 (questioning reasonableness of expecting
jury to evaluate risk-benefit ratios of providing drug to physicians, who use their own exper-
tise to choose among alternative therapies in light of vast amounts of relevant data covered in
NDAs).
135. See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980) (find-
ing warning to doctor inadequate despite adequacy of product label warning); Stephens, 602 F.
Supp. at 381 (refusing to hold FDA-approved warning provided to medical profession ade-
quate as matter of law and determining that warning adequacy is question for jury); Wooder-
son v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan.) (holding that jury may find
warning to doctor inadequate despite FDA determination that possibility of harm, which did
occur, was insufficient to warrant warning in product label), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
136. See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 658-59 (holding required uniform labeling not conclusive of
warning's adequacy when single scientific study might persuade jury that label was inade-
quate); McGewen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534 (Or. 1974) (finding that
reasonable manufacturer would have communicated additional warning despite fact that FDA
already required inclusion of authorized package insert with product).
137. See Wooderson, 681 P.2d at 1057 (rejecting argument that court should defer to FDA's
determination, which rejected warning label because evidence of causation was unconvinc-
ing); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 378-79 (NJ. 1984) (upholding liability despite
FDA denial of request to include warning that Declomycin caused discoloration in teeth of
infants even after repeated attempts by manufacturer to include warning); see also Upjohn To
Challenge $127.6 Million Verdict, Says Trial Court Wrongly Excluded Evidence, 19 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, 1169 (Oct. 25, 1991) (noting that physician used medication for
unapproved use and that FDA had refused to permit warning against such use).
138. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 378-79 (allowing manufacturer to be held liable for failure to
adequately warn in spite of FDA conclusion that evidence of substantial risk is not present);
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981) (stating that jury may decide
evidence of danger is associated with drug even though manufacturer is unconvinced that
drug is dangerous); see also Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal
and State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 Food DRUG COSM. LJ. 171, 193 (1986) (stating that
liability finding when risk is not sufficiently substantiated under federal law is equivalent to
liability finding for unknown risk). But see McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 232
(D.S.D. 1983) (refusing to extend liability to manufacturer who neither knew nor should have
known of drug's adverse reaction potential); Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 792 (Ala.
1984) (holding that no legal theory could justify recovery when danger could not be known
through reasonable human foresight and manufacturer neither knew nor should have known
drug could cause injury); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
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is a direct affront to the public policy of providing physicians with
warnings that reasonably reflect the current state of scientific
observation.
3 9
Manufacturers are thus caught between independent arbiters of
drug safety. Both the FDA and the court system have extensive co-
ercive power that is little affected by the other. Common sense
might dictate that when conflicting regulatory demands are present,
the expertise of an independent agency should bear significant or
even presumptive weight. 140 Unfortunately, such is not the case.
Alternatives to this concurrent regulation are the subject of the re-
mainder of this Comment.
III. MODEL ALTERNATIVES TO CONCURRENT REGULATION
A. Judicial Preemption
A number of commentators have argued that under the
Supremacy Clause, 4 1 federal regulation preempts state common
law liability with respect to pharmaceuticals. 142 Such analyses take
(refusing to hold manufacturer liable for injury of which it neither knew nor had means to
know, because plaintiff's injury was first reported instance of adverse reaction). Judges have
even gone so far as to suggest that manufacturers should bypass the FDA entirely and warn
physicians directly of suspected adverse reactions that do not meet the FDA's requirement of
sufficiently substantiated evidence of causation. See Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147,
1169-70 n.20 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (noting that manufacturers could use adver-
tising, promotional literature, letters to medical profession, and sales personnel to communi-
cate risks). This view, however, is probably incorrect because regulations subject virtually all
of a manufacturer's communications with the medical community to labeling restrictions
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k)(2) (1991) (provid-
ing that brochures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars,
price lists, catalogs, house organs, letters, motion pictures, film strips, lantern slides, sound
recordings, exhibits, literature, and other materials describing drugs to medical community
are treated as "labeling" and thus are regulated by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
139. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (discussing role of warnings in provid-
ing public with complete safety information).
140. See Pennington Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regu-
late?, 43 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 119-20 (1988) (noting persistent attempts of states to
regulate from courtroom and recommending that determinations by FDA, independent gov-
ernmental agency, be given precedence under federal preemption doctrine).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of
the Land").
142. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 127, at 288-89 (describing chilling efflect of liability on
drug production and advocating federal preemption to decrease tort liability); Landen, supra
note 140, at 119-20 (arguing that both Supremacy Clause and common sense support conclu-
sion that state tort actions for defective drug designs and labeling are federally preempted);
Michael R. Taylor, Federal Preemption and Food and Drug Regulation: The Practical, Modern Meaning
of an Ancient Doctrine, 38 FOoD DRUG CosM. L.J. 306, 314-17 (1983) (finding very narrow scope
of preemptive function of drug regulation); Jennie Clarke, Comment, Federal Preemption: A
Vaccine Manufacturer's Defense, 56 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 515, 543 (1988) (concluding that addi-
tional regulation of pertussis vaccine beyond usual FDA approval and criminal penalties for
sale of any other DTP vaccine is clear evidence of preemption of state tort causes of action);
John F. Del Giorno, Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Phar-
maceutical Industry Overdosing on State Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22J. MARSHALL
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issue with the case-by-case risk-utility analyses engaged in by lay ju-
ries that occur despite the existence of comprehensive federal regu-
lation. 143 From such regulation, congressional intention to preempt
state common law causes of action might be inferred. 144 While
some courts have approached this result by exempting prescription
drugs from exposure to strict liability, 145 adoption of a federal pre-
emption analysis in the absence of clear guidance from Congress
has been avoided.' 46
This reluctance stems from a perception that the aims of federal
regulation and state common law are so different as to not interfere
with one another. That is, the state has an interest in providing
L. REv. 629, 656 (1989) (concluding that judicial recognition of federal preemption is only
antidote to conflicting demands on drug manufacturers); Note, A Question of Competence: The
Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REv. 773, 792-93 (1990) (urging
judiciary to defer to institutional expertise of FDA by means of Supremacy Clause).
143. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 138, at 193 (arguing that lay jury is simply not compe-
tent to find that expert advisors to FDA erred in evaluation of scientific evidence supporting
warning adequacy). Adjudicative regulation reaches its extreme when juries conclude that a
drug should never have been marketed. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 374-83
(NJ. 1984) (refusing to permit FDA risk-utility analysis to supplant that ofjudicial process).
144. See Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 998-1001 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (holding
that while preemption is not expressly found in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, com-
prehensive regulation and vital federal interest in uniformity of drug labeling establish pre-
emptive inference when state common law causes of action are found to undermine federal
objective), rev'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1988).
145. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., No. 90-0573, 1991 Utah LEXIS 44, at *2 (May 14,
1991) (recognizing FDA approval as basis for exempting prescription drug from strict product
liability); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (limiting scope of product
liability to design defects and analyzing failure to warn of reasonably knowable dangers under
negligence standard). In Brown, the California Supreme Court found that public interest in
the development, availability, and reasonable pricing of drugs outweighed consumer interest
in strict liability principles. Brown, 751 P.2d at 477. The court extended the protection of
comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to all prescription drugs as a
matter of law. IA Comment k provides an exception to strict liability for products that are
incapable of being made safe for their intended use, provided that their utility outweighs their
apparent risks and proper warnings are given. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. k (1965) (exempting unavoidably unsafe products accompanied by adequate warning
from strict liability exposure). Other courts, however, have declined to extend comment k
protection to prescription drugs. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th
Cir. 1989) (noting that drafters of comment k considered and rejected extension of strict
liability exemption to all prescription drugs); Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., 669 F. Supp. 212,
216-17 (N.D. I1. 1987) (holding medical literature discussing safer alternatives to vaccine suf-
ficient to counter manufacturer's argument that its drug was unavoidably unsafe); Toner v.
Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 306-08 (Idaho 1987) (determining that particular drug's benefits
must clearly outweigh its risks for comment k to apply, and finding that such exemption obvi-
ously does not apply to all drugs).
146. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding
decisive fact that defendant can point to no statutory language or legislative history lending
credence to conclusion of congressional intention to preempt state tort law); Graham v. Wy-
eth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (requiring clear notice of congressional
intention to preempt states from protecting citizens through judicial process because federal
regulations traditionally set minimum standards); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 592 A.2d 1176,
1191-92 (NJ. 1991) (Feldman II) (holding that no federal preemption may attach when federal
law does not clearly require drug manufacturer to obtain prior approval from FDA before
warning of known or knowable danger), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3878 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
compensation for drug-induced injuries using the police powers of
the common law. 147 The federal government, on the other hand,
has a national interest in ensuring that drugs are safe before they
reach the public. 148 In light of these differing interests, courts have
refused to protect manufacturers from common law liability without
a replacement remedy for plaintiffs' drug-induced injuries.
149
B. No-Fault Compensation for Drug-Induced Injuries
1. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
In 1986, Congress recognized for the first time that product liabil-
ity for vaccines was a matter of national concern. 50 Responding to
the fact that liability for vaccine-related injuries was driving manu-
147. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 391 (NJ. 1984) (recognizing state inter-
ests in protecting public and compensating injured persons and noting that such compensa-
tion interest is especially strong when there is little risk that common law interferes with
effective regulation).
148. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (addressing FDA's responsibility to
monitor drug safety and efficacy).
149. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that
courts may find preemption only where Congress has left no room for supplementary state
regulation), rev'g 651 F. Supp. 993, 999 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (inferring preemption of common
law liability, which impinges on FDA's determination of safety and efficacy, because determi-
nation is sole function of FDA); MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp, 743, 745-46
(D.N.M. 1987) (finding that remedy of compensating injuries need not be forfeited by state
that accepts drug into its market); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489-91 (D.
Kan. 1987) (finding strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law in
absence of express preemption and refusing to extend immunity from liability to pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer despite compliance with FDA regulations); Wack v. Lederle Lab., 666 F.
Supp. 123, 127-28 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (refusing to immunize manufacturer and deprive injured
plaintiff of civil remedy when federal alternative not provided by Congress); Feldman, 479
A.2d at 380, 383 (finding no justification for immunizing all prescription drug manufacturers
from strict liability); accord Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D. Utah 1987) (find-
ing no congressional intent to preclude access to common law remedy even after promulga-
tion of National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which was designed to provide no-fault
compensation for vaccine related injuries).
In 1976, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide federal
preemption of state causes of action against medical devices. See Medical Device Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988))
(forbidding any state from enforcing any requirement "which relates to the safety or effective-
ness of the device"). The requirements under these amendments for tampon and breast im-
plant labeling have had a preemptive effect over product liability actions, yet courts have not
addressed the fact that plaintiffs have consequently been denied a remedy. See Moore v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that causes of action for
defective manufacture, labeling, and warning may be preempted where FDA regulations spe-
cifically apply); Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 & n.2 (D. Minn. 1989)
(finding that 17 of 18 courts found preemption applied in device labeling requirements for
tampons); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D. Conn. 1989) (holding
failure to warn of breast implant leakage not actionable under state common law when im-
plants were in compliance with medical device amendments); see also John Agar, Labeling of
Prescription Devices for the Food and Drug Administration and Product Liability: A Primer-Part 11, 45
FoOD DRUG CosM. LJ. 569, 573-76 (1990) (examining preemptive function of Medical Device
Amendments).
150. See H.R. REP. No. 908, supra note 35, at 4-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344-
48 (recognizing negative effects of product litigation on vaccine industry).
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facturers out of the market15 ' and that children injured by vaccines
were having to resort to tort relief for compensation,152 Congress
provided an innovative solution.' 53 The National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Program, 154 created as part of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,155 provides a no-fault system of com-
pensation for injuries caused by any of seven childhood vaccines. 156
Recognizing that those injured by childhood vaccines were immu-
nized largely for the benefit of public health, Congress set out to
provide a reliable source of compensation for vaccine-associated in-
juries that specifically eliminated the need for the costly and lengthy
uncertainty of common law adjudication.' 57
Petitions under the Act are heard in the United States Claims
Court, which determines eligibility and award amounts for compen-
sable injuries.' 58 To avoid delay and controversy over causation is-
sues, the Act describes in a Vaccine Injury Table a number of
injuries for which compensation eligibility is presumed.' 59 A special
master is appointed to assist in obtaining evidence and to prepare
findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law that are presented
to the court.' 60 In determining award eligibility and compensation,
151. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing liability burden forcing vac-
cine manufacturers to exit marketplace).
152. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (noting that Congress sought to eliminate
need for children injured by vaccines to seek compensation through costly and lengthy
litigation).
153. See H.R. REP. No. 908, supra note 35, at 4-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344-
48 (describing Congress' attempt to remedy crisis in vaccine availability and improve injury
compensation by establishment of no-fault compensation program).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (1988) (establishing National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program).
155. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (1988)).
156. See generally Alan R. Hinman, The National Vaccine Program and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 44 FooD DRUG CosM. LJ. 633, 633-36 (1989) (describing general pur-
poses of program, goals and duties of National Vaccine Advisory Committee, and require-
ments of providers of immunizations under program). The vaccines covered include:
diptheria and tetanus toxoids (DT); measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR); diptheria, tetanus,
and pertussis (DTP); poliomyelitis, and any combination thereof. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14
(1988).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 908, supra note 35, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348
(outlining dual objectives of National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of providing expeditious
method of compensating children injured by vaccines and establishing predictable determina-
tions of manufacturer liability).
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-12 to -13 (1988) (giving United States Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion to hear petitions, determine eligibility, and grant compensation under National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act); see CL. CT. R. app.J, at 59 (detailing rules including review of claim
for completeness, assessment of validity of claim, and development of proposed settlement).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1988) (presenting Vaccine Injury Table and describing
revision procedures for Table). Death and injuries including seizures, convulsions, paralysis,
brain damage, and shock-colapse caused by the administration of specific vaccines warrant
compensation under the Act. Id
160. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c) (1988) (detailing duties and requirements of special master
designated by United States Claims Court).
224 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:199
the sole issue before the court is whether, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the injury was vaccine related.' 6 1 The Act provides that
the injured party shall be compensated from a trust fund,' 62 which is
financed by an excise tax imposed on each dose of covered vac-
cines. 163 Compensation includes nonreimbursable medical ex-
penses, rehabilitation, lost wages, and a pain and suffering award
that may not exceed $250,000.164
While not entirely preempting a common law remedy, Congress
significantly limited such recourse by enacting this statute. First and
most important, in return for a more certain and efficient dispute
resolution process, petitioners must exhaust all remedies provided
through the Act before bringing any action in tort. 165 Accepting
compensation under the Act or failing to file a tort claim within
ninety days of a judgment under the Act precludes any further claim
against a manufacturer. 66 Second, the Act adopts comment k of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 167 by stating that a
vaccine is an unavoidably unsafe product and that no liability should
attach when a vaccine is properly prepared and accompanied by an
adequate warning. 68 The Act creates an explicit presumption that
a vaccine is accompanied by proper direction and warning if the
manufacturer shows it complied with all requirements imposed by
the FDA.' 69 Third, manufacturers may not be held liable for failing
to warn users directly, rather than through a learned intermedi-
ary. 170 This provision specifically overrules a number of decisions
that require a direct warning for vaccines. 17' Finally, compliance
161. See id. § 300aa-13 (stipulating determination procedures for compensation
eligibility).
162. Id. § 300aa-15(i).
163. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132 (1988) (imposing tax on "taxable vaccines," which in-
clude vaccines for diptheria, tetanus pertussis, measles, mumps, rubella, and polio).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (1988).
165. See id § 300aa-1 1(a) (barring civil action for eligible persons until remedies under
Act are exhausted); id § 300aa-21(a) (describing petitioner qualifications and petition con-
tent). The American Medical Association had further argued for establishing a no-fault com-
pensation system as the exclusive remedy for claimants so as to avoid the financial stress on
manufacturer research costs and development. See William A. Check, AMA Offers Recommenda-
tionsfor Vaccine Injury Compensation, 252JAMA 2937, 2939 (1984) (detailing position of AMA's
ad hoc committee on vaccine injury that only exclusive remedy could meet goal of continued
vaccine availability, vaccine development, and participation of health workers in vaccine
programs).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a) (1988).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (1988).
169. Id. Only a clear and convincing showing that a manufacturer engaged in fraudulent
conduct or intentionally withheld information can overcome this presumption. See H.R. REP.
No. 908, supra note 35, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367 (noting that only "sub-
stantial wrongdoing" on part of manufacturer should result in liability).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c) (1988).
171. See Givens v. Lederle Lab., 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that manu-
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with FDA regulations protects manufacturers from punitive dam-
ages absent conscious withholding of safety data.
172
In addition to limiting liability, however, Congress also affirma-
tively sought to enhance patient information and vaccine safety
through adverse drug reaction reporting. 73 For the first time for
any pharmaceutical, the Act mandates that health care providers of
vaccines must report all occurrences of adverse events of the types
listed in the Vaccine Injury Table.174 Moreover, the Act requires
vaccine providers to inform parents of specified information con-
cerning the benefits and risks of childhood vaccines. 175 This infor-
mation must include the frequency and severity of both the disease
to be prevented and the adverse reactions caused by the vaccine.'
76
2. The Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance
While the United States has relied largely on private causes of ac-
tion with fault-based insurance coverage to compensate drug-in-
duced injuries,' 77 a number of other nations have provided for a no-
facturer has affirmative duty to warn user directly when vaccine administered under condi-
tions of small county health clinic); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1267 (5th Cir.)
(requiring direct patient warning when manufacturer knew or had reason to know vaccine
would not be administered by physician), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth
Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that manufacturer must warn patient directly
when manufacturer knows or should have known vaccine would not be administered by
physician).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (1988) (stating that punitive damages will be allowed
if information was withheld prior to approval of vaccine, subsequent to approval of vaccine, or
if manufacturer engaged in criminal or illegal activity relating to safety and effectiveness of
vaccine).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 908, supra note 35, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344-45
(discussing how manufacturers must keep detailed records regarding vaccines, while report-
ing any potential problems to federal agencies within 24 hour period of discovery of prob-
lem). The House Report also details the requirements for development and distribution of
parent information materials, recalling of hazardous vaccines, and performance of studies on
the sufficiency of warnings and labels. Id
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25(b) (1988) (mandating reporting of any event listed specifi-
cally in Vaccine Injury Table that occurs within seven days of vaccine administration). The
National Vaccine Program uses both vaccine-specific adverse reaction forms and the FDA's
Adverse Drug Experience Form (Form 1639) to manage communication between state health
departments and the Centers for Disease Control. See Hinman, supra note 156, at 635-36
(explaining system of reporting and noting that such reporting will lead to unitary system of
surveillance).
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25(a), (c) (1988) (mandating distribution of vaccine informa-
tion materials to legal representative of child receiving any vaccine listed in Vaccine Injury
Table).
176. Id. The information form, projected to be as long as 3500 words per vaccine, is likely
to create workload problems in clinics, particularly in those that serve parents with limited
reading skills whose infants receive more than one inoculation during a visit. See Hinman,
supra note 156, at 636 (expressing concern that such paperwork may deter some physicians
from providing needed services, forcing children into more crowded facilities).
177. See Henry Grabowski, Product Liability in Pharmaceuticals: Comments on Chapters Eight and
Nine, in THE LIABILrrY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 360,
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fault insurance system of redressing at least some of these harms.17 8
Generally funded by the pharmaceutical industry or private insur-
ance, such systems compensate persons without the lengthy process
or expense of tort law.' 79 The Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance is
one model. 180
In establishing the Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance in July
1978, the Swedes concluded that the costs of legally establishing the
elements of negligence or strict liability were higher than the costs
incurred in a system of injury compensation lacking determinations
of fault.' 8 ' The system attempts to provide an efficient institutional
361 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litons eds., 1991) (noting how United States, unlike other
countries, relies on tort litigation and regulation for consumer protection).
178. See Diana Brahams, No Fault Compensation Finnish Style, THE LANCET, Sept. 24, 1988, at
733, 733-36 (describing Finnish system, which provides no-fault compensation for pain and
suffering, loss of amenities, and lost earnings that exceed other benefits). Drug importers and
manufacturers fund the Finnish system, which provides prompt compensation for injuries
caused by drugs. Id. at 733. However, no compensation is provided for medically justifiable
treatment where no equally effective procedure is available. Id at 734; see also PHARMACEUTI-
CAL ADMINISTRATION INJAPAN, RELIEF SYSTEM FOR SUFFERERS FROM ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS
87-94 (Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau Ministry of Health and Welfare [Japan] ed., 4th ed.
1988) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN] (delineating no-fault drug in-
jury compensation system funded by industry and subsidized with additional charges imposed
on manufacturer of injuring drug in individual cases); infra notes 181-97 and accompanying
text (discussing Swedish system). In contrast to that in Finland and Sweden, relief under the
Japanese system does not depend on whether the severity of the injury or the adverse reaction
was known. PHARMACEUTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra, at 87.
New Zealand provides a comprehensive, no-fault personal injury compensation system
aimed at restoring injured persons to fullest physical, mental, social, and economic capacity.
See Michael Whincup, Accident Compensation in New Zealand, in PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE
AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON 203, 205-13 (Geraint
G. Howells ed., 1990) (examining compensatory mechanism focusing on injury rather than
causation providing universal comprehensive entitlement for all accidents to obviate anxiety,
waste, and frustration of English system). The system is funded by a levy on employers
(577o), the self-employed (12%6), motor vehicle licenses (14%), and the government (17%).
Id. at 207. In a departure from the scheme's focus on injury rather than causation, drug-
induced injuries are compensated only if the side effect goes beyond what could reasonably be
expected by a physician as likely to arise from a prescribed treatment. Id. at 211.
Germany, on the other hand, has adopted a statutory scheme that mandates the purchase of
insurance and provides for liability based on strict liability for defects in development, pro-
duction, or labeling. See Geraint G. Howells, Drug Product Liability in West Germany and Sweden,
in PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
COMPARISON, supra, at 190-96 (finding liability restricted to "harmful effects which go beyond
a measure defensible according to the findings of medical science" as equivalent to standard
where the "therapeutic value outweighs the harmful effects" of drug). Salient features of the
scheme are the concept of defectiveness and statutory limit on liability. Id. at 192.
Although most forms of insurance are essentially "no-fault," the term is commonly used in
a narrower sense to describe insurance designed to replace the present system of negligence
law and liability insurance. ROBERT E. KUTON, INSURANCE LAw § 4.10, at 246 (1971).
179. See Brahams, supra note 178, at 733 (explaining mechanics of no-lhult system in Fin-
land and noting that Finland's inquisitorial legal system deterred plaintiffs with its extraordi-
nary slowness and poor chance of success). Interestingly, the Finnish Bar Association
supported the no-fault system as being in the best interest of patients. Brahams, supra note
178, at 733.
180. See Brahams, supra note 178, at 733 (concluding that Swedish Pharmaceutical Insur-
ance is efficient, effective, and vastly superior to fault-based liability systems).
181. See Carl Oldertz, The Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance-Construction and Rules, in DETrc-
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risk-utility analysis outside of an adversarial system. I8 2
The system is not based on a statute, but rather was established by
a voluntary agreement between the pharmaceutical industry and a
consortium of insurance companies.' 83 Funding of the system oc-
curs entirely through levies on the industry.' 8 4 Making a claim is
exceptionally simple, requiring only that a form be filled out with
the aid of a patient's physician rather than an attorney.18 5 The form
is submitted to the insurer and is reviewed, along with all pertinent
medical records, first by the insurer's medical assessor and then by
physicians who are employed as part-time advisors to the scheme.1
8 6
A "preponderant probability" standard is utilized by reviewers to
determine whether a drug caused an injury.187Questions of princi-
ple or disputes in indemnification are, if requested by an injured
individual or an insurer, referred to The Drug Injury Committee,
which will issue a statement on its findings with respect to the right
to receive compensation.188 If a dispute persists following the com-
mittee's findings, final determinations are decided by arbitrators in
TION AND PREVENTION OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS 259, 261 (Harry Bostrom & Nils Ljung-
stedt eds., 1984) (noting that only attorneys gain from protracted litigation and uncertain
outcomes of fault-based system).
182. See id at 259, 261-62 (concluding that voluntary nature of scheme allows for faster
changes in implementation than legislated system and cuts administrative costs and that use
of arbitration boards for dispute resolution permits faster case handling than court system).
183. See Harry Bostrom & Pentti Ajo, Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden and Finland, in
TRENDS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND No-FAULT COMPENSATION FOR DRUG-INDUCED INJU-
RIES 9, 9 (Sheila R. Shulman & Louis Lasagna eds., 1990) (stating that in 1978 pharmaceutical
industry manufacturers and importers, along with number of insurance companies, agreed to
create scheme to complement existing system of patient insurance for injuries occurring in
course of medical treatment). Although the system was created voluntarily, it was spurred by
threat of legislation. See Howells, supra note 178, at 197 (describing how proposed legislation
in Sweden providing for strict liability for drugs prompted voluntary insurance agreement).
184. See Bostr6m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 9 (noting that participation in scheme is condi-
tion of manufacture, import, or sale of drugs in Sweden).
185. See Diana Brahams, The Swedish Medical Insurance Schemes, THE LANCET, Jan. 2/9, 1988,
at 43, 46 (mentioning that lawyer may assist with ciaim but that this is not usual or necessary).
As an added benefit, this system of injury communication enhances the patient-physician rela-
tionship. See Bostr~m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 9 (explaining that preparation of claim is
collaborative effort between patient and physician).
186. See Brahams, supra note 185, at 46 (noting that advisory physicians do not decide
compensation amounts but rather provide opinions on causation and expected length of
disabilities).
187. See Bostr6m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 9 (explaining standard of review under Swedish
system for determining injury causation). If it is known that a particular drug will cause inju-
ries of a certain type, liability is often accepted, subject to guidelines of reasonably accepted
risks, if it cannot be shown that there is another reason that is at least as probable. See
Oldertz, supra note 181, at 265. A close temporal relationship between the taking of a drug
and an injury is also strongly supportive of a claim. Id at 265-66.
188. See Oldertz, supra note 181, at 270 (noting eight-member committee includes repre-
sentatives for interests of patient, policyholder, medical science, medical authority, and also
includes chairperson appointed by government who has deciding vote).
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accordance with the Swedish Arbitration Act.
189
To be compensated, a claimant must sustain a significant disabil-
ity measured by bodily injury and/or time away from work. 190 The
seriousness of the claimant's illness is an essential element in deter-
mining whether compensation is awarded; the more serious the con-
dition, the greater risk an individual is expected to assume. 19'
Recovery is minimal by American standards, providing a maximum
of $69,500, with an average indemnification of $12,000.192 These
awards are nonetheless generally adequate because the program is
only one of a wide network of medical insurance plans. 1
93
Accepting compensation subrogates all other remedies to the in-
surance consortium, which has agreed not to pursue indemnification
from individual manufacturers.1 94 Recovery under the plan is there-
fore not strictly no-fault, inasmuch as inquiry into the injury is not
merely focused on determining causation. 195 In fact, a very specific
189. See id. (noting that even if plaintiff loses case before arbitrator, insurer must pay arbi-
trator's remuneration if reasonable cause existed for dispute review).
190. See Bostr6m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 9 (explaining that claimant must suffer inability
to work for continuous period of 14 days, bodily impairment lasting similar period, perma-
nent bodily injury, or death before claimant or claimant's heirs may obtain compensation).
Known adverse reactions or reactions that should reasonably be accepted as a consequence of
using a particular drug, however, are not indemnified unless the injury has significantly im-
paired a person's ability to work. Id. Elements in this determination include: (1) the nature
and severity of the disease for which a drug was used; (2) the general health of the claimant;
(3) the severity of the adverse drug reaction; and (4) the foreseeability of the adverse reaction.
Id
191. See Bostrrm & Ajo, supra note 183, at 11 (noting that primary reasons for denying
coverage include failure to establish causal connection, minor nature of injury, reaction is
reasonably expected, or reaction is reasonable given the serious state of patient's condition).
A reasonable guideline for compensation imposes a restriction that a drug injury has to be at
least as great as the injury that would have been suffered had the drug not been used. See
Oldertz, supra note 181, at 267 (questioning whether this principle ought to be used to reduce
compensation by amount comensurate with injury that would have been suffered had disorder
not been treated).
192. See Bostr6m & Ajo, supra note 183, at I 1 (reporting that limitations on recovery in-
clude caps on individual awards and total benefits and reductions in recoveries resulting from
exceeding maximum yearly fund).
193. See Bostr6m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 11 (observing that 70%o of all benefits under
Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance are used to compensate pain and suffering and that lost
wages, medical treatment, and nursing care are covered by other national programs). Indeed,
some have argued that access to a universal health care system would significantly reduce the
use of legal remedies for drug injuries. SeeJon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, 256
SCIENCE 168, 169 (1992) (noting that while nationalized health care may not be solution to
vaccine liability, there is no reason to give pharmaceutical manufacturers special legal status
that might not result in more or better vaccines).
194. See Bostr~m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 13 (describing relationship between manufac-
turers and insurance companies under Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance program); see also
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.10(a) (1988) (defining subrogation as eq-
uitable doctrine facilitating adjustment of rights to avoid unjust enrichment by substituting
one person or entity in place of another in regard to claim or right that second person or
entity has against third party).
195. See Brahams, supra note 185, at 44 (commenting that "no-fault" is inaccurate because
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risk-utility analysis is performed before compensation is awarded.
196
As a result, decisions take on a measure of uniformity over time and
provide both manufacturers and consumers with a degree of cer-
tainty of rights and responsibilities that is not possible at common
law. 
9 7
IV. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
The costs of pharmaceutical product liability consist of direct ex-
penditures for defending liability claims 198 and indirect costs to con-
sumers reflected in the chilling of research, 199 the elevated price of
drugs, 200 and the simple unavailability of particular therapies.
20 1
Such costs are reasonable only if product liability enhances product
safety beyond that which federal regulation provides and/or if prod-
uct liability efficiently spreads the risk of drug-induced injuries by
compensating those injured. Unfortunately, product liability has
not brought about either of these benefits.
20 2
Any analysis of the costs and benefits of pharmaceutical product
liability suffers from a serious paucity of relevant data. Beyond the
specific examples noted in Part 1,20 3 very little quantitative data
exists to document the actual costs or benefits to consumers of
product liability litigation.20 4 Individual manufacturers are under-
standably unwilling to discuss the expense of in-house counsel,
outside attorneys, trial preparation, settlements, and judgments.
20 5
scheme provides compensation without apportioning blame for unanticipated reactions or
events arising from medical treatment in which error was causal factor).
196. See Bostr~m & Ajo, supra note 183, at 9 (stating that inquiry focuses on several con-
siderations such as nature and severity of treated disease, general health of patient, severity of
reaction, and foreseeability of reaction).
197. Cf Lasagna, supra note 17, at 337 (arguing that product liability litigation is unpre-
dictable, and risks associated with liability are impossible to quantify).
198. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 337 (explaining that costs of litigation include legal
advice and services, compensatory damages, and possible punitive damages).
199. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 336-37 (noting that costs of drug research coupled with
liability risks adversely affect pharmaceutical development).
200. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (mentioning effects of product liability
on vaccine costs).
201. See supra notes 18-22, 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing current unavailability
of drugs such as Halcion and Bendectin as result of product liability claims).
202. See supra note 31 and accompanying text and infra notes 235-37 and accompanying
text (positing that product liability does not significantly enhance drug safety over that pro-
vided by federal regulation and describing how system fails to compensate drug-induced inju-
ries adequately).
203. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (examining drug costs with respect to
vaccine development).
204. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 335 (noting inadequacies of tracking court settlements
and paucity of data on liability costs to pharmaceutical industry).
205. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 335 (observing that out of court settlements are com-
mon and that publicizing their size would encourage new suits or increase future settlement
demands).
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Jury awards are often reduced, 206 and settlements are frequently
sealed. 207 Moreover, liability expenditures cannot be accurately dis-
tinguished from other legal costs. 20 8
In addition, indirect assessments of the costs and benefits of prod-
uct liability are not wholly adequate. One recent study of insurance
expenditures found that for those pharmaceutical companies stud-
ied, losses were nearly double the amount of premiums paid,20 9 and
these losses represented an increase of more than 250% between
1980 and 1984.210 The authors reported that relatively few pharma-
ceutical companies were represented in their study and that the
study period was one of considerable competition within the insur-
ance industry, however.2 11 Another study found a strong upward
trend in federal product liability filings against the pharmaceutical
industry.2 12 The study revealed, though, that only five companies
accounted for seventy-two percent of the filings and that two of
these five, A.H. Robbins and Merrell Dow, accounted for sixty per-
cent of filings owing to the Dalkon Shield and Bendectin disputes,
respectively. 213
The costs of product liability, however large, add to the already
extraordinary costs and risks of new drug development.214 Re-
search and development of a new chemical entity now takes, on av-
erage, over twelve years and costs, on average, over $230 million,
206. See Swazey, supra note 31, at 297 (relating senior pharmaceutical company attorney's
remarks that "nuisance money" is "real hassle" because companies are forced to settle by
threat of runaway juries even though jury awards are often reduced on appeal).
207. See Diana Brahams, Secrecy and Product Liability Litigation, THE LANC:ET, Sept. 22, 1990,
at 737, 737 (stating that sealing of files as part of settlement deal is commonplace in United
States).
208. See Lasagna, supra note 17, at 335 (discussing difficulty in distinguishing between
percentage of costs attributable to product liability and to other routine legal needs).
209. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, An Industrial Profile of the Links Between Product
Liability and Innovation, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 17, at 97 (Table 3-8) (assessing data
compiled from Insurance Service Office for product liability coverage between 1980-1984).
210. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 209, at 97.
211. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 209, at 85.
212. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH, THE RAND CORP., PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BusINESS
SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURT, 38-42 (1988) (identifying and evaluating
trends in product liability claims brought against major pharmaceutical manufacturers be-
tween 1974 and 1986).
213. Dungworth, supra note 212, at 40-41; see also Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 23,
at 801 (finding drop in plaintiff success rate in pharmaceutical product liability suits from 48%
to 38% between 1979 and 1989 in federal court cases with published opinions).
214. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALT
ECON. 107, 121-26 (1991) (examining research and development costs of 12 United States-
owned pharmaceutical firms). The requirement for increased preapproval patient exposures,
heightened complexity and scope of research required, and adoption of expensive new tech-
nologies have added to costs. Id. at 133. As the American population ages, manufacturers
have also begun to focus on treatments of chronic and degenerative disorders, which require
longer and more costly development. Id. at 132-33.
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twice the cost of ten years ago.215 For every 10,000 chemical enti-
ties examined, twenty enter animal studies and ten of these enter
human trials, but only one gains FDA approval.216 Furthermore,
estimating the additional postapproval cost of liability is nearly im-
possible given that adverse reactions may not appear during preap-
proval testing.21
7
Critics of tort reform might point to equally impressive profits
made by the pharmaceutical industry as an indication that whatever
the cost of liability, the industry is more than able to absorb the risk
of liability under the current system. These profits are growing at a
time when drug prices are increasing faster than other medical ex-
penses.218 A recent staff report of the Senate Special Committee on
Aging documented a number of startling statistics, which included:
(1) during the first six months of 1991, the annualized general infla-
tion rate was 3.3%, while the annualized prescription drug inflation
rate was 11.2%;219 (2) the drug industry has an average annual
profit margin of 15.5%, which is more than three times the annual
profit margin of the average Fortune 500 company;220 (3) the aver-
age American pays 62% more for prescription drugs than the aver-
age Canadian citizen and 54% more than the average European
citizen;221 and (4) drug manufacturers will spend over one billion
215. DiMasi, supra note 214, at 125-26 (measuring costs in 1987 dollars). Of the com-
pounds that survive preclinical testing and continue through human drug trials, only 23% are
ultimately approved by the FDA. Id.
216. See P. Roy Vagelos, Are Prescription Drug Prices High?, 252 SCIENCE 1080, 1082 (1991)
(providing odds for getting pharmaceutical to market and noting that statistics do not reflect
increased difficulties concerning new technologies and more complex diseases). Research
and development costs, while high in absolute terms, pale in comparison to the benefits de-
rived from monies saved as a result of morbidity and mortality prevented. See Craig C. White
et al., Benefits, Risks and Costs of Immunization for Measles, Mumps and Rubella, 75 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 739, 739-40 (1985) (noting that vaccination programs prevented approximately 1.5
million rubella cases, 2.1 million mumps cases, and 3.3 million measles cases). The bill for
the nation's measles, mumps, and rubella vaccination programs in 1983 came to $100 million,
while the cost of treating these disorders would have been $1.4 billion. See id. at 741 (Table 2)
(compiling statistical data on vaccination programs from 1983).
217. See ALFRED GILMAN, GOODMAN AND GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THER-
APEUTICS 64 (8th ed. 1990) (observing that one-half of both useful and adverse effects of
drugs are not recognized during clinical trials and are later reported by practicing physicians).
218. See Gina Kolata, Why Drugs Cost More in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at DI (report-
ing economists' claims that drug companies, even foreign ones, charge Americans dispropor-
tionate share of companies' research costs). According to industry representatives, however,
high prices are the cost of a preeminent drug industry, I. at D3; see also Vagelos, supra note
216, at 1081 (noting increased research and development costs, increased preapproval re-
quirements, and resulting diminished period of patent protection as among elements causing
increased drug prices).
219. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG., 1ST SESs., THE DRUG MANU-
FACTURING INDUSTRY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFITS 28-29 (Comm. Print 1991).
220. Id. at 39.
221. Id at 13.
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dollars more on marketing and advertising than on research. 222
Such profits may merely reflect the fiduciary duty of a manufac-
turer's directors and officers to the manufacturer's stockholders.
223
The argument that drug profits are excessive takes little notice of
the chilling effect that product liability has on pharmaceutical re-
search and development. The issue, rather, is whether product lia-
bility deters unacceptable risks and sufficiently compensates those
injured by adverse drug reactions to warrant its continued negative
impacts on drug development and availability.
There is little evidence to support an adequate risk-deterrent
function under negligence theory when a manufacturer cannot
know before marketing a drug what a jury will find a company knew
or should have known about the harm that drug might cause.22 4 Ad-
ditionally, assessing causation of adverse drug reactions is extremely
difficult and expensive. 225 The presentation of often complex scien-
tific issues of causation through the testimony of competing expert
witnesses can create considerable unpredictability at trial.226 This is
especially problematic when such experts express opinions of dubi-
222. Id. at 10. Moreover, the drug industry currently receives a $2 billion nonresearch
and development-oriented tax credit, id at 17, giving it 264% more in tax credits per em-
ployee than it pays in wages. Id at 18. At current inflation trends, an average $20 prescrip-
tion purchased in 1980 will increase by 600% to $120.88 by the year 2000. Id. at 8.
223. See Vagelos, supra note 216, at 1081 (arguing for alternative perspective on pharma-
ceutical industry's high profitability).
224. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (discussing jury determination of ade-
quacy of manufacturer labeling and minimal protective effect provided manufacturers
through compliance with FDA regulations).
225. See Claudio A. Naranjo et al., Idiosyncratic Adverse Drug Reactions: Challenges to Clinical
Pharmacologists, in IDIOSYNCRATIC ADVERSE DRUG REAcTIONS: IMPACT ON DRUG DEVELOPMENT
AND CLINICAL USE AFTER MARKETING 1-7 (Claudio A. Naranjo & Judith K. Jones eds., 1990)
(discussing reasons why adverse drug reactions are not detectable in standard premarketing
and postmarketing studies and consequently require special procedures for their detection,
assessment, and verification).
226. See Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266-67 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(describing judge's close attention to demeanor and tone in determining credibility of expert
testimony), modified, 788 F.2d 741 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); see also Huber,
supra note 127, at 333 (noting that Ph.D. holder can be found to swear to almost any "expert"
opinion); Peter Huber,Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES,July 8, 1991, at 68, 71 [hereinafter
Huber, Junk Science] (noting that since 1975 both federal and state courts have been more
tolerant of scientific testimony). The Wells case resulted in a $5.1 million judgment for the
plaintiff primarily on the strength of unpublished and inconclusive studies associating birth
defects with spermicidal jelly. See Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 294 (relying on unpublished 1976
Oechsli study, 1977 Smith study, and 1975 Population Reports article entitled "Vaginal Con-
traceptives-A Time for Reappraisal?"); see also Huber,Junk Science, supra, at 70 (arguing that
judgment against Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. was based largely on strength of "grossly inac-
curate" study).
1992] PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 233
ous scientific validity227 not readily understandable by a lay jury. 228
A report of the Attorney General's Tort Policy Working Group
found considerable abuse of expert testimony in drug liability
cases.229 Moreover, even if a causal relationship is determined at
trial, the jury is often no better qualified to calculate damages rea-
sonably than it was to resolve scientific disputes. 230
Strict liability theory imposes a risk-deterrent effect by encourag-
ing manufacturers to invest in product safety. 23 1 This rationale,
however, is less compelling in the case of pharmaceuticals that have
extensive social utility but are inherently risky because of the varied
reactions they may induce in individual human physiologies.
23 2
Strict liability may drive certain products off the market and deter
research despite aggregate health benefits that are greater than the
risks of injury.2 3 Most importantly, exposing pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers to strict liability fails to take into account the FDA's as-
sessment of social utility. Strict liability thus creates excessive
administrative or transactional costs in the form of litigation ex-
penses, with little or no improvement in safety as measured by those
actually injured.
23 4
227. See Robert L. Brent, The Irresponsible Expert Witness: A Failure of Biomedical Graduate
Education and Professional Accountability, 70 PEDIATRICS 754, 755 (1982) (maintaining that some
experts are willing to express opinions in courtroom that they would not voice in scientific
forum). Dr. Brent suggests the quality of expert testimony would improve if depositions were
exposed to peer review. Id. at 761.
228. See Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for
Judicial Defense to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (1989) (noting that
medical expert testimony is often too complex for juries to understand).
229. See REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 62-
63 (1986) (finding personality and demeanor of expert witnesses were often more critical in
determination of issues than "decades of evolving scientific and medical investigations and
thought"); see also Marc S. Klein, Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical Product Liability Actions, 45
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 393, 395 (1990) (delineating major societal implications of abuse of
expert testimony in pharmaceutical product liability cases).
230. See Note, supra note 142, at 781 nA4 (observing that tendency for overcompensation
in such situations is great because jury sympathizes with injured plaintiffs and perceives de-
fendant manufacturing companies to have "deep-pockets").
231. See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What
Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 Ky. LJ. 705, 745-47
(1990) (noting courts' belief that product sellers will lack incentive to promote safety absent
forced responsibility for product-related injuries).
232. See, e.g., Bruce S. Bochner & Lawrence M. Lichtenstein, Anaphylaxis, 324 NEW ENG.J.
MED. 1785, 1786 (1991) (stating that no known epidemiologic characteristic exists that relia-
bly identifies those at risk for serious drug sensitivity, other than previous exposure).
233. See Huber, supra note 127, at 304-05 (finding that consumers as whole benefit by
absorbing small risk of individual significant adverse reactions when loss of drug entirely
would deprive many more consumers of drug's considerable utility).
234. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 102-03 (1970) (arguing that it may be
cheaper to achieve societal goals through direct means rather than through indirect means
such as imposing tort liability); Ausness, supra note 231, at 753 (arguing that FDA's licensing
process may ensure pharmaceuticals are properly evaluated and any additional costs brought
by strict liability would exceed any marginal benefits gained therefrom).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:199
The tort system fails even more completely as a means of com-
pensating injuries. 235 The initial difficulty of getting into the legal
system includes, by itself, the rather formidable obstacles of recog-
nizing the causal relationship between an injury and a drug, identi-
fying legal privileges, and gaining access to competent counsel. 23 6
A vast majority of drug-induced injuries go uncompensated as a re-
sult of the rigors of the tort system.237
Empirical data from the study of medical negligence demon-
strates the inadequate compensatory mechanism of the common
law. 23 8 The Harvard University School of Public Health examined
over 31,000 medical records in fifty-one hospitals in New York in
1984.239 Of the patients who suffered adverse events clue to medical
personnel negligence, less than three percent filed claims. 240 More
importantly, the study concluded that the cost of compensating all
injured patients for medical expenses, lost wages, fringe benefits,
and lost household production was considerably less than the $1
billion paid in malpractice costs in 1984.241 Indeed, this coverage
could include all iatrogenic injuries of greater than six months
whether or not they were caused by negligence. 242 There is no evi-
dence to suggest that the common law is any better at compensating
235. See Note, supra note 142, at 783-85 (observing that excessive inefficiencies of tort law
result in inadequate compensations and overdeterrence); see also A. Russell Localio et al., Rela.
tion Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245,
249 (1991) (noting reasons why few patients pursue tortious medical claims).
236. See Note, supra note 142, at 784 (finding that such hurdles make recovery highly un-
likely for majority of injured persons).
237. See Abel, supra note 11, at 796-97 (citing numerous studies documenting infrequent
recovery for tortious injury).
238. See Localio et al., supra note 235, at 248, 250 (concluding that evidence shows that
civil justice system rarely compensates negligently injured patients and usually fails to identify
substandard health care providers, much less hold them responsible, inasmuch as so few neg-
ligently injured patients find their way into system).
239. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL IN-
JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORE 2-3 (1990) [herein-
after HARVARD STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS].
240. See Localio et al., supra note 235, at 247-48 (Figure 1) (reporting that out of 27,179
adverse events due to negligence, only 415 (27o) resulted in malpractice claims). Over half of
the more seriously injured patients were under the age of 70, resulting in significant losses in
earnings. Id. (finding number of persons under age of 70 negligently injured to be 2,834).
The authors questioned whether it is possible for the malpractice system to have a beneficial
effect on medical care if so few with legitimate claims actually find their way into court. Id. at
249.
241. See HARVARD STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS, supra note 239, at 11-7 (not-
ing cost of compensating all such injuries was only slightly more than malpractice premiums
alone).
242. Id. Subsequent examination of a no-fault system of injury compensation has found
the system to be more efficient than the common law. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics
and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System, 265.JAMA 2836, 2842-
43 (1991) (concluding that accelerated compensation system using adverse event probabilities
would more quickly compensate injured patients at less cost than current liability-based sys-
tem while serving to develop useful medical data).
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drug-induced injuries than it is at compensating those injured by
medical malpractice.243 A more efficient remedy is a no-fault insur-
ance scheme.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
An American no-fault insurance system would draw on the mod-
els set forth by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 244 and
the Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance program. 245 The system
would require all manufacturers to participate and would be funded
by the industry through an excise tax on medications sold across the
United States. 246 This would shield the American taxpayer from di-
rectly funding the system and would allocate risk to members of the
industry in some proportion to their market share of drug sales.
The system would be administered through the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), which would establish a review
board and procedures for determining eligibility for relief and
means of compensation. 247 Review boards would oversee in-
quisitory rather than adversarial proceedings, and determinations
would focus solely on causation and claim eligibility.
248
Eligibility would be based on a reasonableness standard that
would take into account the seriousness of an injury and the serious-
ness of a patient's condition. 249 Moreover, eligibility standards
would reflect the need to compensate serious injuries regardless of
foreseeability. 250 Causation would be accepted if the drug is found
243. See HUBER, supra note 32, at 225-26 (finding administrative costs of judicial system
are always more costly than purchase of relevant insurance by all exposed to injury).
244. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text (discussing National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Act).
245. See supra notes 178-97 and accompanying text (examining Swedish Pharmaceutical
Insurance).
246. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text (detailing considerable profits within
industry that would permit coverage of both compensation and administrative costs).
247. Cf. supra note 186 and accompanying text (detailing use of independent insurance
reviewers in Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance System); supra note 158 and accompanying
text (noting use of United States Claims Court for arbitrating claims under National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act). Placement of the scheme within HHS would enhance the pro-
gram's public health function by providing a means by which adverse drug reactions could be
readily detected.
248. Cf. supra note 158 (describing fact-finding focus in determining compensation eligi-
bility under National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act to encourage claimants to seek remedy
under Act).
249. Cf supra note 190 (outlining Swedish calculus of reasonable compensation). Denying
compensation to persons suffering reactions that were reasonable in light of the seriousness
of their condition furthers the principle that manufacturers are not absolute insurers of their
products. Patients would still be expected to accept some risk as a condition of treatment.
250. Cf. Brahams, supra note 185, at 44 (noting that under Swedish system compensation
of serious injury is not limited by unforeseeable nature of injury). Compensating unforeseen
injuries would have the effect of encouraging the reporting of unforeseen reactions. Not com-
pensating reasonably foreseeable injuries would retain the incentive among manufacturers to
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more likely than not to have caused the injury. 251 This standard
would be based on a reasonable medical certainty, as assessed by
experts in medicine and pharmacology. Compensation levels would
provide reasonable coverage of medical expenses, lost wages, and
rehabilitation. 252 The ultimate aim of the regulations would be to
provide an enhanced opportunity for compensation over that pro-
vided by the common law. 253
A remedy in tort would be available only after exhaustion of all
administrative procedures under the program. 254 Accepting com-
pensation under the scheme would preempt any remedy at common
law.255 Compensation at common law would be available only upon
a showing by clear and convincing evidence that a manufacturer




It is time to stop pleading with the judiciary to take uniform notice
of scientific expertise, and it is time to take lawyers out of the pro-
cess of determining public safety.2 57 Unfettered drug development
and drug injury compensation are social goods that should be pur-
sued without resorting to an adversarial legal system. The regula-
continually evaluate the safety profile of their products. Compensating serious injuries
whether or not they were foreseeable promotes the compensatory function of strict liability
without the administrative costs of the common law.
251. Cf. supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that Congress adopted preponder-
ance of evidence standard for eligibility under National Childhood Vaccine Injury Program);
supra note 187 and accompanying text (describing preponderant probability standard under
Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance).
252. Cf supra notes 164, 191 and accompanying text (detailing compensation schemes
under Swedish system and National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).
253. Cf supra note 165 and accompanying text (examining explicit congressional intent to
encourage remedies provided under National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).
254. Cf supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining deterrent mechanism under
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act against seeking remedy at common law). Retaining a
tort remedy in some fashion would maintain some vestige of its deterrent effect.
255. Cf supra notes 166-94 and accompanying text (noting that acceptance of compensa-
tion under Swedish system and National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act precludes remedy at
common law).
256. Cf. supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' explicit adoption
under National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of comment k and presumption that drug warn-
ing is adequate if approved by FDA).
257. See Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to
Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs Qff the Marhet,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 446 (1990) (recommending that courts extend great weight to
peer-reviewed scientific observation as decisionmaking tool in complex causation litigation
involving drugs). But see Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Issues in Tort Reform: Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Oto
ST. LJ. 387, 396 (1987) (finding no-fault system of National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
applicable to very narrow product with relatively few adverse events that are well defined as
triggers for compensation, and inapplicable to majority of drugs).
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tory demands of the common law simply do not provide a risk
deterrent function that is more comprehensive than the federal reg-
ulatory system currently in place. Moreover, the compensatory
function of the common law is wholly inadequate, providing pre-
cious few injured persons a sufficient remedy.
A no-fault system of drug injury compensation would provide a
more efficient means of compensating persons injured by adverse
drug reactions, enhance public safety by linking compensation
under the scheme to the current adverse drug reaction reporting
system, and provide manufacturers with predictability as to the ex-
tent of liability. Congress should take the initiative and establish a
compensation system without fault for adverse drug reactions as an
affirmative alternative to the common law.

